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This dissertation provides a new way to explain mispricing in REITs from the 
perspective of illiquidity. I hypothesize that REITs’ illiquidity prevents informed 
traders fully utilize the private price information and prevents them arbitrage 
against mispricing, leading to a persistent divergence between REIT’s transaction 
price and its fundamental value. Moreover, because the variation of REIT’s 
individual illiquidity moves closely with the market-wide illiquidity, mispricing in 
REITs can be explained by stock market illiquidity.  
The hypothesis is tested by looking at a panel of 174 REIT firms from January 1, 
1993 to December 31, 2008. Using 2SLS models, I find that the lagged market-
wide illiquidity can explain 14% of variation in REITs mispricing after controlling 
for size and value effects.  
I also find that the lagged market illiquidity has a stronger explanation power for 
mispricing when market return is declining, market volatility is high, and inflation 
rate is high. This result suggests that REITs face stronger illiquidity risk in down 
markets than in up markets, thus investors who are interested in REITs as a 
diversification tool should consider the attributes of REITs liquidity in up and 
down markets 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The dramatic rise and fall of the real estate market returns in recent years raise 
increasing concerns about whether the stock price movement is a result of 
mispricing or is just a reflection of fundamental changes. Academics are still 
debating about whether there is mispricing in the real estate market. Some 
academics believe that the real estate market is generally efficient, where the 
information of fundamental price variation is fully incorporated into market prices 
(Hamelink and Bond, 2003; and Hoesli, 2004).  On the other hand, some 
academics have found the existence of mispricing in real estate securities market, 
where real estate stocks with certain characteristics have abnormal returns relative 
to standard asset pricing models. These pricing anomalies include size 
(Reinganum 1981; McIntosh, Liang, and Tompkins, 1991), book-to-market 
(Capaul, Rowley, and Sharpe, 1993) and momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; 
Chui, Titman, and Wei, 2003) anomalies.  
More importantly, academics are curious about what are the causes of mispricing 
in the real estate market? Amihud (2002), Acharya and Pedersen (2005) and Sadka 
(2006) argue that mispricing is actually an illiquidity risk premium. In an illiquid 
market, investors face high transaction costs, difficulty to trade large volumes in a 
short time and significant impact of trading volume on stock prices, thus they will 
require higher expected return to compensate for the illiquidity risk. Others like 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1995) argue that mispricing arises because investors are 
slow to adjust to news related with asset prices. They also find that investors tend 
to over-react to firm-specific information. Still others like Brunnermeier and 
Chapter One – Introduction 2 
Julliard (2008) argue that mispricing arises as a result of money illusion: investors 
cannot distinguish whether the changes in nominal prices are due to changes in 
real values or due to inflation.  
This dissertation tests whether REITs are mispriced and whether stock market 
illiquidity can explain REITs mispricing. There is reason for believing that 
illiquidity can account for REITs mispricing.  Kyle (1985) and Glosten (1985) 
suggest that market price is determined by market makers based on the trading 
orders that they have received. In a frictionless world, market makers cannot 
distinguish whether an order is from informed traders or uninformed traders, so a 
rational market maker uses only part of the information disclosed by the trading 
orders. Therefore, information is incorporated into asset price in a gradual way, 
and is revealed more and more when informed traders arbitrage against the 
mispricing. However, mispricing will not be arbitraged away if arbitrage is costly 
as a result of market illiquidity (Shleifer, 2000). Thus prices will remain in a non-
equilibrium state in a period of time when assets are illiquid.  
It is important to be noted that this dissertation focuses on systematic illiquidity 
instead of individual illiquidity. The difference between them is that individual 
illiquidity refers to the trading costs of individual asset, while systematic 
illiquidity focuses on the correlated movements in illiquidity across individual 
assets and the aggregate market (Chordia, Roll et al, 2000). Specifically, Chordia 
find that the variation of daily changes of liquidity measures co-move with the 
changes in market liquidity (the equally weighted average liquidity of all other 
stocks).  Systematic illiquidity could arise from several sources. Since volatility 
and interest rate are major determinants of dealer inventory holding costs, their 
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variation seem likely to cause co-movements in the optimal inventory level, which 
lead to co-movement in the individual bid-ask spreads, price impacts, and other 
measures of illiquidity (Vayanos and Street, 2004). The co-movement of 
individual illiquidity can be reinforced by correlated trading styles of institutional 
investors (Chordia, Roll et al, 2000). It is found that institutional investors tend to 
trade in the same direction over a period of time. (Malpezzi and Shilling, 2000). 
So the assets which are held by “herding” institutional investors are likely to have 
correlated illiquidity variations.  
This empirical finding of systematic illiquidity raises a new question as whether 
aggregate market illiquidity is a state variable in asset pricing. Empirically, 
Amihud (2002) finds that expected market illiquidity positively affects ex-ante 
stock excess returns.  Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) find that the stocks that are 
more sensitive to aggregate illiquidity have substantially higher expected returns. 
Acharya and Pedersen (2005) argue that simply CAPM model cannot fully 
capture the properties of assets returns, and they introduce an illiquidity-adjusted 
CAPM model allowing for the incorporating of illiquidity into asset pricing.  
As the common stocks market literature suggests that systematic illiquidity is one 
of the sources of common stocks’ mispricing, it is natural to argue that whether 
REITs’ mispricing can be also explained by systematic illiquidity. All of the 
empirical tests of the mainstream literature (Amihud, 2002; Pastor and Stambaugh, 
2003; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005) exclude REITs, so their results cannot be 
automatically extended to REITs. REITs, as a group of investments, warrants a 
separate research for at least two reasons.  
First, there are a few notable differences between REITs and non REIT ones, 
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which will influence their levels of mispricing. Compared to common stocks, 
REITs is restricted to mainly invested in rental income producing real estate. And 
different from common stocks, REITs are required to distribute 90% of their 
income into the hands of shareholders, and the corporate income tax on the 
distributed dividends is eliminated. Due to these differences in required assets, 
dividends, and tax structure, news affecting the real estate asset class tend to be 
different from news affecting other non-REIT industries. Specifically, Danielsen 
and Harrison (2007) find that REITs are relatively hard to value since REITs are 
driven by a series of local economies, given their long-term leases in fixed local 
sites. They state that there is less information available to REITs’ investors when 
the price is driven by a series of local economies, since each of the local variable 
has its own rent circle. Womack(1996) also finds that REITs react relatively 
slowly to changes in price information. His empirical finding shows that the non-
REIT stocks’ prices react strongly and quickly to changes in analyst 
recommendations. But for REITs, even one week after their NAVs are released to 
the public, less than half of the information has been incorporated into REITs’ 
prices. Thus, REITs are more likely to be mispriced. 
The second reason that why it is necessary to study REITs’ mispricing and 
illiquidity because they will affect diversification opportunity. One of the major 
reasons people invest in REITs is to diversify a portfolio dominated by common 
stocks, but the diversification opportunity also has to do with illiquidity and 
mispricing. If illiquidity of an individual REIT co-moves with market-wide 
illiquidity, the REIT’s pricing will be influenced not only by individual factors, 
but also stock market illiquidity. As a result, REITs and non-REIT stocks will face 
common illiquidity risks, and the diversification effect of REITs will be weakened. 
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This dissertation hypothesizes that systematic illiquidity is a source of REITs’ 
mispricing. REIT’s illiquidity is expected to co-move with common stocks’ 
illiquidity (Subrahmanyam, 2009). When stock market illiquidity increases, 
individual REIT firm’s illiquidity will also increase.  The increasing of REIT 
firm’s illiquidity leads to a larger magnitude of mispricing because the  
information of REIT’s fundamentals is not fully incorporated into REIT's prices 
when the REIT is illiquid (Kyle, 1985).  At the same time, high individual 
illiquidity prevents investors from arbitraging against the mispricing, so 
mispricing persists in REITs.  
The question that whether stock market illiquidity helps explain REITs’ 
mispricing is tested by looking at a panel dataset of the REITs stocks listed in 
NYSE from Jan.1993 to Dec.2008.  Since mispricing is unobservable in the stock 
market, this dissertation starts with the computation of mispricing of every REIT 
firm. Mispricing is computed as the difference between observable return and 
fundamental return. However, measuring fundamental value of an asset is a 
important but unsolvable question in the academics. This dissertation adopts 
Chordia, Huh and Subrahmanyam (2009)’s method, which assumes that the 
fundamental required rate of return can be captured by market risk in CAPM 
model (Fama, 1993). Given that mispricing is highly dependent on the choice of 
the asset pricing model, this dissertation adds another two widely used systematic 
risk factors, namely the size factor (SMB), and the value factor (HML). As there 
is no definite answer on how to measure fundamental price, this dissertation 
cannot rule out alternative ways, but adding two widely-used factors will largely 
reduce the errors caused by model mis-specification.  
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The mispricing of every REIT firm is then regressed on lagged aggregate stock 
market illiquidity using panel regression techniques. 2SLS regression model is 
adopted because the dependent variable mispricing and the independent variable 
market illiquidity are found to have endogeneity problem. REITs mispricing have 
an effect on market illiquidity. For example, if stocks are mispriced in the last 
period, uninformed traders who determine asset price based on historic price 
information are more likely to have information asymmetry problem, leading to 
higher level of market illiquidity (Kyle, 1985).  
Using 2SLS regression, the dissertation finds that the lagged market-wide 
illiquidity can explain 22% of REITs mispricing estimated from standard CAPM, 
and can explain 14% of variation in REITs mispricing estimated from FF3, which 
control for size and value effects. The empirical results suggest that market 
illiquidity helps explain mispricing in REITs.  Market illiquidity will prevent 
private information from being fully incorporated into REITs transaction prices, 
leading to a larger magnitude of divergence between transaction prices and their 
fundamental value.  
This dissertation also tests whether the explanation power of market illiquidity on 
REITs mispricing is more significant in down markets than in up markets. The 
reason to expect that the explanation power is stronger in down markets is that 
declining markets increase the possibility that fund managers fall below a target 
return and force them to liquidate their holdings, increasing the demand of 
market-wide liquidity. At the same time, declining markets also increase the 
inventory risk of market makers, decreasing the supply of market-wide liquidity. 
With the change of both demand and supply of market-wide liquidity, the 
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systematic illiquidity across various assets will be high in declining markets. As 
the systematic illiquidity across various assets increases, market illiquidity will 
have a stronger effect on REITs mispricing.  
As expected, this dissertation finds that market illiquidity has a stronger 
explanation power for REITs mispricing when market return is declining, market 
volatility is high, and when inflation rate is high. The results suggest that REITs 
face stronger common illiquidity risk in declining markets.  
1.2 Significance 
This dissertation adds new knowledge to current literature in two areas: 
First, this dissertation explains mispricing in REITs from the perspective of stock 
market illiquidity.  While mispricing in direct property market has been studied by 
several researchers (Shilling, 2003; Brunnermeier and Julliard, 2008), mispricing 
in REITs remains relatively unexplored. Previous literature in REITs illiquidity 
focuses on the trend of illiquidity in REITs (Nelling et al., 1995; Clayton and 
MacKinnon 2000) and its determinants (Below, Kiely and McIntosh, 1996; 
Bhasin, Cole and Kiely, 1997), but not research on whether the illiquidity will 
influence REITs pricing.  
This dissertation finds that the lagged market-wide illiquidity can explain 22% of 
REITs mispricing estimated from standard CAPM, and can explain 14% of 
variation in REITs mispricing after controlling for size and value effects. By 
focusing on market-wide illiquidity instead of individual illiquidity, this result is 
consistent with the argument that illiquidity should be a state variable in asset 
pricing (Amihud, 2002; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; Sadka, 2006). This result 
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suggests that individual REIT firm will be mispriced when the general market is 
illiquid, so investors who invest in REITs to diversify away market risks need to 
be prudent in market-wide illiquidity risk.  
Second, the finding that market illiquidity has a stronger effect on REITs 
mispricing in down markets provides new insights for the puzzle of asymmetric 
diversification opportunity in REITs. The asymmetric diversification puzzle refers 
to the evidences that diversification opportunity of REITs tends to disappear in 
declining market (Goldstein and Nelling, 1999; Sagalyn, 1990; Clayton and 
Mackinnon , 2001; Glascock, Michayluk and Neuhauser,2004 ; Basse, Friedrich 
and Vazquez Bea, 2009). This dissertation indicates that since REITs return face 
stronger common effects of market-wide illiquidity in declining markets, the 
correlation between REITs return and common stocks return tend to be closer. 
This highlights the importance for investors who use REITs as a diversification 
tool to consider the attributes of REITs liquidity in up and down markets 
1.3 Organization 
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows： Chapter 2 reviews the related 
literature in financial markets and in REITs. This dissertation first reviews the 
financial literature that finds that mispricing is related with illiquidity. Then three 
microstructure theories that try to explain why mispricing is related with 
illiquidity are reviewed. The theories include information asymmetry theory, 
inventory risk theory and liquidity premium theory. Second, I shift emphasize 
from individual illiquidity to market-wide illiquidity and review how systematic 
illiquidity can explain mispricing. Finally, I review the literature on REITs 
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illiquidity. 
Chapter 3 develops the testable hypothesizes. This chapter first discusses the 
relationship between mispricing and individual illiquidity. Then the sign of market 
illiquidity on mispricing is derived according to comparative statics. 
Chapter 4 presents data and preliminary tests. The attributes of illiquidity measure 
and the evidence of systematic illiquidity are provided in this chapter to provide a 
background for future analysis. 
Chapter 5 discusses the empirical findings. First, mispricing component is 
regressed on lagged stock market illiquidity. Then 2SLS regression techniques has 
been used to show that systematic illiquidity helps to explain REITs mispricing in 
up and down markets. 
Chapter 6 concludes. 
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
There is increasing evidence that stocks’ mispricing is related with illiquidity 
(Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Jones, 2002; Amihud, 2002; Pastor and 
Stambaugh, 2003; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005). This chapter first reviews the 
three lines of theories that try to explain why illiquidity can cause mispricing. 
Inventory risk theory points out that illiquidity increases mispricing because 
investors require higher expected return relative to assets’ fundamental values to 
compensate for the bid-ask spread caused by inventory risk (Smldt, 1971; Garman, 
1976; Amihud and Mendelson, 1980, 1986). Information asymmetry theory states 
that illiquidity causes mispricing because information is incorporated into 
transaction prices gradually rather than immediately as stated by market efficiency 
theory (Bagehot, 1971;  Kyle, 1985; Easley and O'Hara, 1987). Liquidity premium 
theory suggests that investors require higher expected return to compensate for 
transaction costs, but the compensation is small as investors will increase holding 
period and decrease trading frequency when they face high transaction costs 
(Constantinides, 1986; Heaton and Lucas, 1996; Vayanos, 1998;  Huang, 2003).  
While illiquidity has been regarded in these microeconomic theories as a firm 
attribute that has a positive relationship with expected returns, the existence of 
systematic illiquidity suggests that market-wide illiquidity could be an important 
risk factor in asset pricing. This chapter then shifts the emphasis from individual 
illiquidity to systematic illiquidity. I provide a detailed review on the existence, 
the sources of systematic illiquidity, and how systematic illiquidity cause 
mispricing. Specifically, Amihud (2002) argues that market illiquidity positively 
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affects ex ante stock excess return. Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Acharya and 
Pedersen (2005) argue that stocks that are more sensitive to market liquidity have 
higher expected returns relative to standard asset pricing models.  
Finally, this chapter highlights the main findings in REITs liquidity literature. 
These findings include that liquidity in REITs increases from 1986 to 1996 
(Bhasin, Cole and Kiely 1997; Nelling et al. 1995; Clayton and MacKinnon 2000), 
and REITs illiquidity is determined by institutional ownership (Below, Kiely and 
McIntosh (1996)), price, dollar volume, and return volatility (Bhasin, Cole and 
Kiely (1997)); new REITs (Cole,1998)) 
2.2 Finance Literature 
2.2.1 Mispricing and Individual Liquidity Premium  
There is increasing evidence that stocks are mispriced relative to standard asset 
pricing models such as CAPM and FF3 models. The pricing anomalies include 
size (Reinganum 1981), book-to-market (Capaul, Rowley, and Sharpe, 1993) and 
momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Chui, Titman, and Wei, 2003) 
anomalies.  
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) argue that mispricing in stock market is actually 
an illiquidity risk premium. In his model, investors require higher expected return 
to compensate for the bid-ask spread, and the influence of spread on expected 
return will be amortized during the holding period. Using relative spread (the 
dollar spread divided by the average of bid and ask prices) to measure illiquidity, 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) find that the annualized return differential 
between the highest and lowest liquidity quintiles of NYSE stocks is 7%. Brennan 
(1996) re-examines the liquidity premium, by decomposing illiquidity into a fixed 
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component and a variable component. He tests the relationship between cross-
sectional expected return and the two components of illiquidity, as well as the bid-
ask spread. Brennan’s result shows a 6.6% liquidity premium between the highest 
and lowest liquidity quintiles of NYSE stocks. These findings are consistent with 
the argument that liquidity is related with mispricing. 
While the cross-sectional individual liquidity premium has been tested extensively, 
there are only few studies on the time series relationship between liquidity and 
mispricing. The basic problem of studying the time series relationship is the 
difficulty to construct daily liquidity measures with transaction-by-transaction 
data. Jones (2002) adds new knowledge to the literature by collecting three daily 
time series from 1990 to 2000, namely quoted bid-ask spreads on large stocks, 
commission costs, and turnover. Using the VAR model, Jones (2002) finds that 
the bid-ask spread and the commission costs positively predict future return, and 
turnover negatively predict return. The empirical result suggests that market 
illiquidity positively predicts expected return.  
In 2002, Amihud provides a comprehensive review and testes both the cross-
sectional and time series relationship between illiquidity and stock return. Rather 
than using transaction-by-transaction data, he measures illiquidity using daily data 
(daily absolute return divided by dollar trading volume) and thus is able to build 
long time period data. He argues that investors require higher expected return to 
compensate for high illiquidity. His empirical finding shows that lagged illiquidity 
positively relates to current expected return.   
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2.2.2 Microstructure Theoretical Explanations  
There are three lines of microstructure theories that try to explain why individual 
illiquidity increases mispricing.  
Inventory risk theory points out that market makers actively adjust bid-ask spread 
to balance inventory position, and investors require higher expected return to 
compensate for the bid-ask spread caused by inventory risk. Information 
asymmetry theory states that market makers need to set a bid-ask spread to trade 
off the losses to the informed traders against the profits earned from uniformed 
traders.  
In contrast to market efficient theory which assumes that information is 
incorporated into transaction price immediately, information asymmetry theory 
argues that information is incorporated into transaction prices during the process 
of trading.  
Finally, liquidity premium theory suggests that investors require higher expected 
return to compensate for transaction costs, but the compensation is small as 
investors will increase holding period and decrease trading frequency when they 
face high transaction costs.  
In this section, Demsetz (1968)’s work is introduced first as he has built the 
fundamental framework for all of the three theories. The following  three lines of 
research is then reviewd.  
Demsetz (1968)’s Framework 
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In one of the earliest paper, Demsetz (1968) has established the foundation of 
microstructure literature. Investors enter into the market and trade with market 
makers. Market makers quote two prices: the bid price, at which they wish to buy 
from investors, and the ask price, at which they want to sell. The ask price is 
typically higher than the bid price, and the difference between the two prices is 
called the bid-ask spread. In his model, supply and demand of assets cannot match 
each other at any point in time, so market makers are needed to clear the market. 
Bid-ask spread serves to compensate the market makers for providing immediacy.  
Inventory Risk Theory 
Inventory risk literature states that market makers actively adjust bid-ask spread to 
balance inventory position. Investors require higher expected return to compensate 
for the bid-ask spread. Smldt (1971) posits that market makers have an optimal 
inventory level, and they will achieve this optimal inventory level by setting bid-
ask prices. Garman (1976) provides a rigorous model to explore the role of market 
makers. In Garman (1976) model, buy and sell orders arrive into the market 
following a Poisson distribution. All orders are traded with market makers, and 
direct trading between investors is not permitted. Market makers can determine 
the price probability functions after knowing the demand and supply of securities. 
Market makers will `fail' if they have subsequent negative inventories and 
insufficient cash, which mean they cannot restore their position. The model 
suggests that market makers will actively adjust bid- ask spread to balance their 
inventory level, in order to avoid market `failure'. Stoll (1978) consents with 
Galman (1976) that market makers set bid-ask prices based on inventory position. 
He presents that bid-ask spread is a function of the cost to achieve optimal 
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inventory level. 
Directly following Galman (1976), Amihud and Mendelson (1980, 1986) present 
models of the development of inventory of market makers. Amihud and 
Mendelson (1980, 1986) argue that investors require higher expected return to 
compensate for the bid-ask spread, and the influence of spread on expected return 
will be amortized during the holding period. 
Information Asymmetry Theory 
Another group of studies states that illiquidity can exist even when there is no 
inventory risk. They emphasize on how information is incorporated into asset 
price when illiquidity exists.  
Bagehot (1971) separates the traders into informed and uninformed ones. 
Uninformed traders only have public information and enter into the market for 
liquidation reasons. Informed traders have inside information about the true value 
of securities. During trading with market makers, informed traders always make a 
profit because they have private information. As a result, market makers need to 
set a bid-ask spread to trade off the losses to the informed traders against the 
profits earned from uniformed traders. 
Kyle (1985) formally models the relationship between information asymmetry and 
market illiquidity. The concept of liquidity includes a number of market 
characteristics: `tightness' (the cost of trading during a short time period); `depth' 
(the influence of order flow on stock price); and `resiliency' (the speed of a market 
to recover from a liquidity shock). His model focuses on `market depth'. He 
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assumes three kinds of investors in the market: noise trader, informed trader, and 
competitive risk neutral market makers. Market makers receive information of the 
sum of quantities traded by noise traders and informed traders, and determine the 
trading prices. Kyle (1985) suggests that order flow gives market makers new 
information about whether the request is from an informed or an uninformed 
trader. Market makers will adjust prices to reflect this new information.  
In Kyle's model, price does not always fully reflect the fundamental value, 
because informed traders will decide whether to incorporate private information. 
His model suggests that informed traders' profit is higher when the market is 
liquid. So informed traders tend to use private information when the market is 
liquid, and hide private information when the market is illiquid. The model 
implies a positive relationship between mispricing and market illiquidity. 
Easley and O'Hara (1987) explain why large trading volume would push asset 
price away from fundamental value. They posits out that market makers are not 
only uncertain about whether the order is informed or uninformed, but are also 
uncertain about whether an information event relevant to the value of the asset 
will occur. The model suggests that informed traders will always trade larger 
amounts to make full use of private information. So large trades imply the 
existence of an information event and informed trading. Market makers will set 
less favorable prices for large trades in order to compensate for losses to informed 
traders.  
Liquidity Premium Theory 
In contrast to information asymmetry theory, the liquidity premium literature 
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focuses on the demand and supply of investors rather than market makers. This 
line of literature typically views trading costs as fixed (or proportional to trading 
volume), and defines liquidity premium as the difference in rate of return between 
an asset with and without transaction cost. 
Early work in this line indicates only a small liquidity premium (ranges from 
0.07% to 3%). In one of the earliest attempts, Constantinides (1986) presents a 
two asset inter-temporal model and states that the liquidity premium due to 
transaction cost is small. This is because high transaction costs will broaden the 
range of ‘no transaction"’, and people will avoid high liquidity premium by 
decreasing trading volume. 
Heaton and Lucas (1996) present a model where traders invest in risky and 
riskless assets to offset income risk. The result of their model also suggests a 
small liquidity premium since investors will consume more when transaction costs 
are high. Vayanos (1998) explains that high transaction costs have two effects. 
First, investors will trade less to avoid high trading costs. Second, investors will 
increase holding period to amortize high transaction costs. As a result of the two 
effects, the influence of transaction costs to asset price is small.  
However, these liquidity premium models are not consistent with empirical 
findings. For example, Constantinides's model suggests that liquidity premium 
ranges only from 0.07% to 3%. However, the liquidity premium indicated by 
empirical studies is quite large. For example, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) 
states that the annual return difference between highest and lowest liquidity 
quintile is 7%, and Brennan, Subrahmanyam (1996) reports an annual liquidity 
premium of 6.6%. The disagreement between theory and empirical results may be 
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due to that early work of liquidity premium theory has not explained the observed 
high frequency of market trading (Huang, 2003). Huang (2003) argues that trading 
frequency is actually much higher than what is expected by early liquidity 
premium models, because investors will be forced to liquidate their holdings when 
facing borrowing constraints. This idea is consistent with Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen (2008), who present that funding constrain is a source of  market-wide 
liquidity risk and market downturn.  
2.2.3 Systematic Liquidity and Market-wide Liquidity Premium  
The early studies focus on how individual illiquidity leads to mispricing, while the 
recent work (Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam 2000; Hasbrouck and Seppi 2001 ; 
Heberman and Halka 2001 ) has shifted the emphasis to how systematic illiquidity 
cause mispricing. Specifically, Amihud (2002) finds that market illiquidity has 
common effects on various assets’ returns. Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Acharya 
and Pedersen (2005) argue that the stocks that are more sensitive to aggregate 
liquidity have substantially higher expected returns. In the following paragraphs, I 
provide a thorough review of the existence, the sources of systematic illiquidity 
and how systematic illiquidity leads to market-wide mispricing.   
The existence of systematic liquidity in stock markets 
The systematic liquidity is defined as the sensitive of individual firm's liquidity to 
aggregate market liquidity. The evidences of systematic illiquidity have been 
documented by a number of recent studies (Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam 
2000 ; Hasbrouck and Seppi 2001 ; Heberman and Halka 2001). 
Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000) test for the variation of daily changes of 
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various liquidity measures (quoted spreads, effective spreads, and quoted depths) 
with changes in market liquidity (the equally weighted average liquidity of all 
other stocks in the sample). Applying a market model, the authors find that 
individual liquidity moves closely with industry-wide and market wide liquidity. 
The co-movement remains significant after controlling for several individual 
liquidity factors such as volume, price level and volatility. Hasbrouck and Seppi 
(2001) conduct a principal component analysis and find that the liquidity of the 
Dow 30 stocks exhibits a single common factor; however the commonality effect 
is not very strong. Huberman and Halka (2001) also find that liquidity across 
stocks have a systematic component in a sample of daily NYSE data. Similar 
conclusion is reached by using intraday aggregate liquidity measure in 
Coughenour and Saad 2004. Their research has reinforced the existence of 
commonality in liquidity, since intraday data is able to control for well-known 
variation of intraday bid-ask spreads. 
These explorative studies above suggest a role of systematic liquidity in common 
stock market, but they do not discuss other markets as REITs. Especially, all of 
the four papers exclude REITs, thus there remains a question as to whether REITs 
illiquidity co-moves with the common stocks market illiquidity. A recent paper by 
Subrahmanyam (2007) presents the first answer on the liquidity spillovers across 
stock markets and REITS and finds the causal relationship in liquidity from non-
REIT stocks to REIT ones  
The sources of liquidity commonality 
Several studies have been done to explain why liquidity co-moves with the 
general market. Broadly speaking, commonality in liquidity can be induced by 
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common variation in the demand for liquidity, the supply of liquidity, or both. 
Demand-generated commonality in liquidity can arise when there are common 
factors which increase or decrease the general desire to trade. In contrast, supply-
generated commonality in liquidity can arise from systematic movement in the 
costs of providing liquidity. Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam(2000) hypothesizes 
that institutional funds with similar investing styles might exhibit correlated 
trading patterns, and thus perform correlated desire for liquidity. At the same time, 
trading volume, market interest rates, and volatility can influence inventory risk 
and affect the supply of liquidity across assets. 
Vayanos and Street (2004) formally models the demand-generated liquidity 
commonality. Their model suggests that investors' trading desire is a function of 
market volatility. High market volatility can decrease the desire to trade, thus 
increase liquidity demand in the general stock market. The liquidity commonality 
can be future reinforced by correlated trading styles of institutional investors. 
Generally speaking, the trading styles of institutional investors include `herding', 
which means a group of investors trading in the same direction over a period of 
time and `feedback trading', which means trading based on lag returns (Malpezzi 
and Shilling, 2000 ). For example, Shiller (1984) and De Long and Shleifer et 
al.(1990) posit that the influences of fad and fashion are likely to impact the 
investment decisions of individual investors. Similarly, Shleifer and Summers 
(1990) suggest that individual investors may herd if they follow the same signals 
such as brokerage house recommendations, or forecasters. And since the managers 
of institutional investors are usually evaluated by recent performance, they are 
more likely to overreact to recent news compared to individual investors. The 
‘herding’ and `feedback trading' can enlarge the correlated liquidity demand and 
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thus destabilize the system. The theoretical model has been empirically proven by 
Kamara et al. (2008), who find that liquidity commonality has decreased for small 
firms and increased for large firms over the period 1963 to 2005, and the 
divergence of liquidity commonality can be explained by institutional ownership. 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen(2008) consider the demand and supply sides jointly. 
Their multi-investors equilibrium model suggests that market return affects 
funding constraints faced by both institutional investors and market makers. 
Therefore, the demand and supply of liquidity is influenced by variation of market 
return. This theoretical paper relates to a large literature including market liquidity, 
funding constraints, banking, arbitrage, and provides a comprehensive framework 
for future empirical tests. 
Asset Pricing with Liquidity Risk 
The covariation of illiquidity across assets suggests that the market-wide liquidity 
have common effects on assets returns. Specifically, Amihud (2002) argues that 
market illiquidity positively affects ex ante stock excess return, because investors 
require higher expected return when the general market is illiquid.  
The positive relationship between market illiquidity and expected return stands in 
contrast to the standard asset pricing models such as CAPM (Fama, 1973) and 
FF3 (Fama, 1992 ). Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) argue that the standard asset 
pricing models cannot fully capture the liquidity risk. Market-wide liquidity 
should be a state variable for asset pricing. Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) find that 
stocks that are more sensitive to aggregate liquidity have substantially higher 
expected returns.  
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Many of the empirical findings on liquidity premium can be summarized in a 
liquidity-adjusted CAPM model (Acharya and Pedersen 2005). The equilibrium 
model suggests three liquidity risk factors that should be added into standard asset 
pricing models. The first factor is the covariance between the asset's illiquidity 
and the market illiquidity: 1 , ,( , )t t i t mCov c c− . This is because investors want to be 
compensated for holding a security that becomes illiquid when the market in 
general becomes illiquid. The second factor is the covariation between a security's 
return and the market liquidity 1 , ,( , )t t i t mCov r c− , which is consistent with Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003) . The last one is the covariation between a security's illiquidity 
and the market return: 1 , ,( , )t t i t mCov c r− . This effect stems from investors' 
willingness to accept a lower expected return on a security that is liquid in a down 
market. The liquidity adjusted CAPM describes several testable hypothesizes for 
future empirical work. 
As liquidity has been documented as a risk factor, a similar important question is: 
whether liquidity can explain the well-known pricing anomalies in financial 
markets? Several literatures have contributed to these questions. 
Chen, Stanzl and Watanabe (2002) find that after accounting for price-impact 
costs, the profit from using size, book-to-market and the momentum strategies 
becomes very small. Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998) re-examine the 
FF3 model and test whether other non-risk characteristics including liquidity 
factors have marginal explanatory power for expected return. They find that the 
trading volume (a measure of stock liquidity) significantly relates to expected 
return even after accounting for the Fama-French three factors. Moreover, the size 
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and book-to-market anomalies tend to decrease after adding trading volume as a 
risk factor. Datar (1998) also suggests that liquidity helps explain the size 
abnormal return as small size stocks are more likely to be illiquid.  
There are also a number of studies who find that market illiquidity helps to 
explain momentum mispricing. For example, Lesmond, Schill, and Zhou (2004) 
find that high momentum premium stocks tend to coincide with high trading costs. 
The high trading costs prevent investors from earning profit from momentum 
strategy. Sadka (2006) decomposes trading costs into fixed and variable 
components and found that variable components of liquidity can account for 40% 
to 80% cross-sectional variation of expected returns from momentum portfolios. 
Sadka (2006) also find that systematic liquidity and momentum profits are 
positively related.  
2.3 Real Estate Literature 
While the relationship between liquidity and mispricing has been studied 
extensively in stock markets, the liquidity in REITs sector has remained relatively 
unexplored. Early studies mainly focus on the change of REITs’ liquidity and its 
determinants. Using intraday data to construct liquidity measures, liquidity in 
REITs increases from 1986 to 1996 (Bhasin, Cole and Kiely 1997; Nelling et al. 
1995; Clayton and MacKinnon 2000).  
The determinants of liquidity in REITs sector is a topic of debate. Below, Kiely 
and McIntosh (1996) find that REITs with higher institutional ownership trade at 
narrower spreads because REITs that have a higher institutional investment ratio 
will be more transparent for investors. Bhasin, Cole and Kiely (1997) formally test 
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the causes of liquidity and found that it is determined by the price, dollar volume, 
and the volatility of stock returns. Reexamining the same data set, Cole (1998) 
points out that the improvements in liquidity are attributable to the `new REITs' 
that went public during 1991 to 1993. Compared to `old REITs', `new REITs' 
employ the umbrella partnership (UPREIT structure) that highlights the benefits 
of the self-advised, self-managed (SASM) organizational structure. Danielson and 
Harrison (2000) test another explanation-the private information- and finds that 
REITs holding more transparent portfolios are more liquid. This line of research 
relies on microstructure theories and thus uses transaction-by-transaction data to 
measure liquidity. Since using intraday data, they can only conduct a relatively 
short period of data series. For instance, Clayton and Mackinnon (2000) find that 
REITs liquidity has been increased from 1993 to 1996, but they only construct the 
liquidity data in 1993 and in 1996. It is possible that there is a reversal during 
1994 or 1995, which has not been examined. 
The increasing of awareness in systematic liquidity in stock market has also 
triggered much interest in REITs research. To study the long-term covariation of 
REITs illiquidity and common stocks illiquidity, one should first compute an 
index to measure REITs illiquidity. Cannon, Cole and Consulting (2008) follows 
Amihud (2002) measure of liquidity and constructs a new panel-data from 1988 - 
2007 period. The long time period data series complement previous literature, and 
can provide a detailed analysis of liquidity change of REITs. So far as I know, the 
only study which tries to understand the covariation of liquidity across equity and 
REITs is from Subrahmanyam (2007). He uses a long time series data from 1988 
to 2002 to study the joint dynamics of liquidity, return and order flow between 
REITs and non-REITs. He finds that the movements of REITs’ liquidity can be 
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forecasted from non-REIT sector, at both daily and monthly horizons. This result 
has many important practical implications.  
2.4 Conclusion 
The dissertation complements previous literature in three aspects. First, it provides 
the first answer on whether and how illiquidity influences mispricing in REITs. 
While previous literature have found that mispricing in REITs is related with size 
effect, book-to market value, momentum effect, this dissertation argues that 
mispricing in REITs can be explained by illiquidity after accounting for the above 
effects. Second, this dissertation shifts the emphasis from individual assets to the 
REITs sector as a whole, and examines the questions such as whether REIT  
firm’s liquidity co-moves with the stock market in general. Finally, this 
dissertation also helps to explain the liquidity crash in declining markets. 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) suggest that liquidity can suddenly dry up, and 
cause sharply declining return. By testing mispricing-illiquidity relationship in up 
and down markets, this study tries to explore the influence of macroeconomic 
factors on illiquidity and its relationship with asset pricing. 
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3 Theoretical Framework 
3.1 Development of Theory 
This chapter presents a model suggesting that mispricing of REITs is positively 
related with aggregate stock market illiquidity. The reason is: when stock market 
illiquidity increases, illiquidity of individual REIT firm will also increase as a 
result of the co-movement of illiquidity. The increase of illiquidity leads to a 
larger magnitude of mispricing because information of fundamentals is not fully 
incorporated into REIT's prices when the REITs are illiquid (Kyle, 1985).  Also 
high individual illiquidity will prevent investors to arbitrage against the mispricing, 
so mispricing persists when illiquidity is high. The rest of the chapter will explain 
this idea in detail. 
To start with, I present the total differentiation between REIT firm’s mispricing 
and stock market illiquidity into a form which allows the incorporation of 
individual illiquidity: 
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where mispricing of REIT firm is defined as the difference between REIT's 
transaction price P  and its fundamental value *P . mdλ is the change of stock 
market illiquidity, while the idλ  is the change of individual illiquidity. 
This model suggests that the relationship between REIT mispricing and stock 
market illiquidity have two components: one is the relationship between REIT’s 
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illiquidity and the market-wide illiquidity, and another is the relationship between 
REIT’s mispricing and its individual illiquidity.  






, an increasing group of literature has suggested that 
the variation of REIT illiquidity moves closely with the variation of market-wide 









The first reason refers to correlated trading styles of institutional investors who 
hold REITs and non-REIT stocks. REITs have become more acceptable to 
institutional investors after 1992 as a diversification vehicle (Below, Kiely and 
McIntosh, 1996). So it is natural for institutional investors to hold both REIT 
stocks and non-REIT ones. It is argued that the institutional funds tend to have 
similar investing styles, leading to correlated desire of liquidity across REIT 
sector and the general stock market. (Kamara, Lou and Sadka, 2008) . 
The second reason is related with the market-wide inventory risk. Inventory risk 
theory suggests that illiquidity is generated as a compensation for market makers 
to maintain inventory position and provide liquidity (Garman , 1976 ; Amihud and 
Mendelson, 1980 ). So the factors which have common effects on market-wide 
inventory risk such as interest rates, and return volatility will generate illiquidity 
across the general market (Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam, 2000).  
Finally, the systematic illiquidity across REITs and common stock market can 
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arise as a result of funding constraints. Vayanos and Street (2004) formally model 
the systematic illiquidity and suggest that investors who face funding constrains 
may be forced to liquidate their positions in many securities. This will increase the 
demand of liquidity across many assets.  
Because of the above reasons, individual illiquidity of REITs is expected to 
comove with the general stock market. Now I can derive the relationship between 






 is known. 
Kyle (1986) provides a framework to study the relationship between mispricing 
and individual illiquidity. I first provide the context and assumptions for this 
analysis. The framework assumes an auction market where a REIT is traded 
among informed traders, uninformed traders and market makers. While this 
assumption is first made by Kyle on common stocks, it can also be applied to 
REITs in the sample of this dissertation because the REIT stocks are listed in 
NYSE and are traded in a similar way as Kyle's assumption. Informed traders 
have private information about the fundamental price *P . Uninformed traders do 
not have any private information and they enter into the market for liquidation 
reasons such as selling stocks for cash. 
Under this framework, I present how mispricing is generated when the REIT is 
illiquid. The trade occurs in two steps. In the first step, informed traders and 
uninformed ones submit to market makers the quantities they want to trade based 
on information available to them. To simplify, suppose the private information is 
‘price will decrease’, so the fundamental price *P should be lower than the REIT's 
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historic price 0P : 
*
0P P< . Informed traders who know this private information 
will submit a sell order. 
The second step is that market makers set a transaction price P based on the 
quantities that submitted to them. If the order only includes the sell order 
submitted by informed traders, the rational behavior of the market makers is to set 
a price which is lower than the historic price 0P P< . The private information that 
"price will decrease" will be fully incorporated into transaction price in this way. 
When information asymmetry exists, however, the market makers don't know 
whether the sell order is from informed ones or uninformed ones. The market 
makers will not adjust price large enough to converge to its fundamental value 
because there is possibility that the order is uninformed. Therefore the private 
information is incorporated into price in a gradational way. Kyle (1986) presents 
that the divergence between fundamental value and the transaction price is 








where P  is the transaction price of the REIT; *P  is the fundamental value of the 
REIT; idλ  is the individual illiquidity of REIT i. 
Kyle (1986) argues that the price will eventually converge to fundamental value as 
more transactions are taken place. So mispricing will eventually disappear as more 
informed traders arbitrage against the mispricing.  However, high illiquidity of the 
asset will prevent informed traders from trading on the private information. 
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Shleifer (2000) states that informed traders trade only when potential profit is 
larger than illiquidity costs. So when asset's is illiquid, its mispricing tends to 
persist for a long time. 
Given the positive signs of equation 3.2 and equation 3.3, the relationship between 
mispricing and market illiquidity is expected to be positive.  
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The model suggests that market illiquidity helps explain mispricing in REITs. 
This is because individual illiquidity of REIT firm co-moves with the market-wide 
illiquidity, and individual illiquidity of REIT firms gives rise to REITs mispricing. 
This provides the testable implications in this dissertation, where Chapter 4 tests 
whether REIT’s individual illiquidity co-moves the general stock market, and 
Chapter 5 tests whether market-wide illiquidity can explain mispricing in REITs.   
The model also suggests that if the co-movement of illiquidity is time-varying, the 
relationship between mispricing and market illiquidity might also be various 
during different time periods. Empirically, Kamara, Lou and Sadka (2008) find 
that systematic illiquidity is more significant in down market than in up market. 
Market declines and high volatility increase the possibility that fund managers fall 
below a determined target for portfolio return, and they have to liquidate their 
holdings (Vayanos and Street, 2004). This increases the demand for liquidity 
across the whole market, which will inturn increase the inventory risk of market 
makers. The correlated change of demand and supply of liquidity will enlarge the 
systematic illiquidity across various assets. Market declines will also affect fund 
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constrains of both market makers and investors, and lower their capability to 
provide liquidity for the market (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2007). Therefore, 
given that systematic illiquidity tends to be more significant in market downturn, 
it is expected that stock market illiquidity will have a stronger effect to REITs 
mispricing in down market. 
3.2 Conclusion 
This chapter presents that mispricing of REITs is positively related with stock 
market illiquidity. This is because information is incorporated into price in a 
gradual way when illiquidity exists, and illiquidity prevents informed traders fully 
utilize the private information available to them. So mispricing is a positive 
function of individual asset illiquidity. And also because individual illiquidity co-
moves with the stock market, the relationship between mispricing and stock 
market illiquidity is expected to be positive. The model helps explain why market 
illiquidity can predict individual REIT return. Also it provides two testable 
implications for empirical studies in the following chapters. The first empirical 
implication is a positive relationship between REITs mispricing and market 
illiquidity. The second is that the relationship is stronger in declining market when 
systematic illiquidity is higher. 
Chapter Four – Illiquidity Measure and Systematic Illiquidity 32 
4 Illiquidity Measures and Systematic Illiquidity 
This chapter presents the attributes of illiquidity measures in REITs and common 
stocks. REITs’ illiquidity levels are higher than those of common stocks, yet 
REITs’ illiquidity dropped dramatically after 1993.  
By testing the systematic attributes of illiquidity measure, this chapter finds that 
the individual illiquidity of REITs co-moves with stock market-wide illiquidity. 
This indicates that the mispricing of REITs will not only be influenced by 
individual factors, but will also be influenced by stock market illiquidity. This 
chapter also finds that the co-movement between REITs illiquidity and stock 
market illiquidity is stronger in a declining market than in an up market. This 
finding indicates the importance of studying the relationship between mispricing 
and illiquidity separately in up and down markets.  
4.1 Illiquidity Level 
4.1.1 Choice of Illiquidity Measures 
Empirical proxies of unobservable illiquidity have been reviewed in Chapter 2. 
They include bid-ask spread (Amibud, Mendelson et al., 1986), price impact 
measures (Amihud, 2002; Campbell, Grossman and Wang, 1993; Acharya and 
Pedersen, 2005; Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003) and turnover1
Amihud’s (2002) price impact measure is used in this dissertation to measure 
.  
                                                 
1 Bid-ask spread is usually used in microeconomic literature which requires data of bid and ask price in every 
transaction. To compute this illiquidity measures for all the common stocks in the market (around 7000 stocks 
across the sample period of 15 years), I will have to account for every transaction data for these 7000 stocks 
every day, which is too daunting for the purpose of this dissertation. 
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illiquidity. Price impact denoted as ,i dλ  is computed as the daily absolute return 
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where ,i dλ  is the illiquidity of asset i  (REIT or common stock) in day d . ,| Re |i d  
is the absolute daily return of asset i  from day 1d −  to day d , ,i dDVol  is the 
dollar trading volume which is the product of the daily transaction price and the 
sum of trading volume on day d . The pooled average of the illiquidity measure of 
REITs is 71.09 10−× . Following Kamara, Lou and Sadka (2008), the measure is 
multiplied by a scale of 71 10×  to explain it in a better way. 
Amihud (2002)’s method is chosen to measure illiquidity mainly for two reasons. 
Firstly, this dissertation’s theoretical analysis is following Kyle (1985). His model 
suggests that illiquidity is reflected from the price change associated with order 
flow. Amihud (2002)’s measure is consistent with the theoretical implication. 
Secondly, this measure has been widely used in recent literature (Acharya and 
Pedersen 2005; Amihud 2002; Cannon, Cole and Consulting 2008; Coughenour 
and Saad 2004; Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003), so it provides a benchmark to 
compare my result in REITs with that in stock market literature.  
As this dissertation focuses on stock market illiquidity rather than individual 
illiquidity, a market illiquidity index is needed. Following Chordia (2000), the 
market illiquidity index of REITs (common stocks) is the equal-weighted average 
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where ,m dλ  is the market illiquidity index of that day; n is the total number of 
REITs (Common Stocks) in the sample for day d.  
4.1.2 Data  
To be comparable with previous studies (Chordia, 2000; Subrahmanyam, 2007), 
only REITs listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) are included in my 
sample. Individual illiquidity measures for 174 REITs and 7248 common stocks 
are computed from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 2008. The data used for 
illiquidity measures is summarized in Table 4-1. Daily dollar trading volumes 
(DVOL), and daily return exclude dividends (RETX) are obtained from The 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
Each REIT must meet the following criteria: 
 has  positive trading volume on day d . 
 trades in regular way in day d , which excludes unusual situations, such as 
being issued for the first time, being reorganized recapitalized or bankrupt, 
and stock splits are also excluded. 
 I exclude outliers with ,i dλ  in the lowest and highest 1% percentiles for every 
day of the sample remaining after applying the first two filters. 
 After using the above filters, a REIT firm included in the sample should have 
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at least 15 days observations in a given month.  
Table 4- 1 Summary Statistics of Data for Illiquidity Measures 
Variables Label Mean Min Max Std 
PRC Price 25.490  0.110  467.250  21.012  
DVOL Dollar Trading Volume 8.515  0.000  2931.358  25.022  
RETX Return Without Dividends 0.000  0.000  2.231  0.027  
SIZE Size 1.321  0.002  27.390  2.153  
 ,i dλ  Illiquidity  1.002  0.008  197.630  6.845  
Note: This table reports descriptive statistics of the key variables in illiquidity 
measure. PRC is the daily price; DVOL is defined as the price times the number of 
trading volumes (in $ million); RETX is daily return without dividends; Size is the 
price times shares outstanding (in $ million). Individual illiquidity measures for 296 
REITs were computed from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 2008. The variables are 
obtained from The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
 
4.1.3 Results of Illiquidity Measure in REITs and Common Stocks 
Daily illiquidity measures for REITs and common stocks for the period from 
January1993 to December 2008 are presented in Figure 4.1. Since the pooled 
average of illiquidity measure for REITs is 71.02 10−× , which is too small to 
present, all of the illiquidity measures are multiplied by 71 10× . The annual 
average of illiquidity measures are reported in Table 4-2.  
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Figure 4- 1 Daily Illiquidity Level of REITs and Common Stocks  
Note: For every REIT firm i, I compute its daily illiquidity from January 1993 to 
December 2008 following Amihud (2002)’s measure of illiquidity. To be included 
into the sample, a REIT should (a) has positive trading volume on day d . (b) 
trades in regular way in day d , which excludes unusual situations, such as being 
issued for the first time, reorganized, recapitalized or bankrupt, and stock splits 
are also excluded. I exclude outliers with ,i dλ  in the lowest and highest 1% 
percentiles for every day of the sample remaining after applying the first two 
filters. After using the above filters, a REIT firm included in the sample should 
have at least 15 days observations in a given month. Then the equal weighted 
average of all the REIT firms' illiquidity in day d is computed as the REIT 
illiquidity index. The equal weighted average of all the common stocks (exclude 
REITs) illiquidity is computed as the common stock illiquidity index. 
From Figure 4-1, we can see that REITs illiquidity dramatically dropped in 1993 
(declined from 4.61 in 1993 to 0.87 in 1998), which coincided with the time when 
the ‘new REITs' went public between 1991 and 1993 (Bhasin, Cole, and Kiely 
(1997). Different from `old REITs', `new REITs' employ the umbrella partnership 
(UPREIT structure). The benefit of this structure is to reduce conflicts between 
the holders of partnership units and REITs shareholders. This may increase the 
Illiquidity 
Year 
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transparency of information between unit holders and shareholders. The dramatic 
declining of REITs illiquidity in 1993 is also possible due to increasing 
institutional investments in REITs. REITs have been more acceptable to 
institutional investors since 1992 (Below, Kiely and McIntosh, 1996). Institutional 
investments increase the trading volume as well as the incentives for REITs to 
publish more information. The decreasing illiquidity may also be attributed to less 
information asymmetry. Danielson and Harrison (2000) argue that REITs became 
liquid after 1993 because they held more transparent portfolios. No matter what 
the reasons, the increased liquidity has made REITs a more attractive investment 
vehicle in the financial market. 
The largest liquidity shock during our sample happened in July 1998, which 
coincided with the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) and the 
influence of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. It took five years for REITs’ liquidity 
to recover to the illiquidity level during early 1998. The second large crash 
occurred in January 2008, which coincided with the mortgage crisis. 
Generally, REITs are less liquid than common stocks. The yearly comparisons of 
illiquidity levels in REITs and common stocks are reported in Table 4-2.This is 
because REITs are relatively hard to value. Since at least 70% to 90% of REITs’ 
assets much be invested in rental income producing real estate (the percentage 
varies in different countries), Danielsen and Harrison (2007) suggests that analysts 
are difficult to predict both of the information in stock markets and the 
information in property markets. Womack(1996) also finds that REITs react 
relatively slowly to changes in price information. His empirical finding shows that 
even one week after REITs’ NAVs are released to the public, less than half of the 
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information has been incorporated into REITs’ prices.  
Table 4-2 also reports the F statistics with the null hypothesis that the average of  
REITs illiquidity measure ( REITλ  ) equals the average of common stocks illiquidity 
measure ( CSλ ). We can see that the average of REITs’ illiquidity is significantly 
higher than that of common stocks in the sample period (F statistics range from 
7.95 to 530.72) expect for 2002 and 2003 (F statistics are 0.02 and 0.04 
respectively).   
Table 4- 2 Comparison of Illiquidity Index of REITs and Common Stocks  
year   
REITs Illiquidity 
( REITλ ) 
 Common Stocks 
Illiquidity ( CSλ ) 
  
 N Mean Std N Mean Std  F( REITλ = CSλ ) 
1993 253 4.612  1.779  2272 1.992 0.329  530.720 
1994 252 2.987  1.135  2465 1.776 0.325  265.100 
1995 252 2.234  0.911  2550 1.361 0.258  214.090 
1996 254 1.706  0.810  2730 0.905 0.175  237.170 
1997 253 1.092  0.519  2834 0.617 0.130  199.700 
1998 252 0.872  0.441  2828 0.685 0.207  37.000 
1999 252 1.222  0.501  2780 0.791 0.115  176.720 
2000 252 1.709  0.662  2606 1.070 0.173  219.840 
2001 248 1.649  0.680  2528 1.223 0.235  86.680 
2002 252 1.022  0.515  2528 1.028 0.193  0.020 
2003 252 0.563  0.362  2520 0.567 0.168  0.040 
2004 252 0.320  0.202  2587 0.234 0.037  43.790 
2005 252 0.297  0.234  2650 0.174 0.024  68.820 
2006 251 0.296  0.240  2679 0.138 0.021  107.900 
2007 251 0.339  0.329  2504 0.122 0.026  107.680 
2008 253 0.700  0.582  2428 0.386 0.197  66.350 
Note: This table depicts the comparison of market illiquidity of REITs and common 
stocks listed in the NYSE. F statistics is reported with the null hypothesis: the average of 
REITλ  equals the average of CSλ . 
   
4.2 Systematic Illiquidity across REITs and Common Stocks 
Figure 4.1 shows that the illiquidity level of REITs and the illiquidity levelof 
common stocks have similar time trends. Both of them have been declining since 
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1993, having begun to increase from 1998, and have been declining again from 
2001. Table 4-3 reports that the correlation between the daily REITs illiquidity 
index and stock market illiquidity index is 0.812 (t-statistic is 87.254), and the 
correlation between the daily variation of the two indexes is 0.668 (t-statistic is 
56.252). The close correlation between the two series indicates the possibility of 
co-movement between them. 
Understanding the co-movement of illiquidity level between REITs and common 
stocks is important because it suggests the possibility that REIT mispricing is 
influenced not only by individual illiquidity factors, but also by stock market-wide 
illiquidity (See theoretical analysis in Chapter 3). This highlights the importance 
of studying whether market-wide illiquidity can explain mispricing of REIT. The 
following section tests whether illiquidity of REIT firms moves closely with stock 
market illiquidity.  
Table 4- 3 Correlation of Illiquidity Measures for REITs and Common Stocks 
 REITλ  REITdλ  
mλ   0.812***  
  (87.254)  
mdλ    0.668*** 
   (56.252) 
This table reports the correlation of REIT illiquidity level ( REITλ ), stock 
market illiquidity level ( mλ ), and the correlation between daily change of 
REIT illiquidity ( REITdλ ), and daily change of stock market illiquidity 
( mdλ ).  
 
4.2.1 Test for Stationarity 
Tests on co-movement relationship require that the two interested data series be 
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stationary, otherwise the examined co-movement might be due to the same time 
trend. The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is used to test the stationarity of 
the illiquidity levels of REITs and stock market. The basic model is: 
1 1 1 ...t t t p t p ta wtλ αλ β λ β λ ν− − −∆ = + + + ∆ + + ∆ +  
4- 3 
where tλ  is the illiquidity level of REITs (or common stocks). a  is constant and t 
is date. The assumption that the level of illiquidity has a trend t and constant a  is 
made based on the time-series plot of illiquidity level of REITs and common 
stocks in Figure 1. α β，  are parameters; tλ∆  is the change of series tλ . Dickey-
Fuller test suggests that if the estimated 0α ≤  , the illiquidity level is non-
stationary.  
Table 4- 4 Unit Root Test for Illiquidity Measure 
 alpha Constant Trend t-Statistic Prob. 
            
REITλ  -0.074  0.198  0.000  -4.955  0.000  
mλ  -0.020  0.026  0.000  -2.912   0.1586 
            
REITdλ  -1.696  
 
 -64.587   0.0001 
mdλ  -4.344      -29.631   0.0000 
Note: This table reports the results of augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test for four 
time series. REITs illiquidity ( REITλ ) and market illiquidity ( mλ ) are tested with the 
assumption that they have a constant and trend, while the daily change of illiquidity for 
REITs ( REITdλ ) and stock market ( mdλ )  do not have. The lag length is automatically 
chosen based on SIC and the max lag length is 30. The null hypothesis is that there is 
unit root 0 : 0H α ≤  
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Table 4.4 reports the ADF test results. The estimated α  for REITs and stock 
market are -0.074 and -0.020 respectively, which are close to zero. That is to say, 
the coefficient of illiquidity and lagged illiquidity are 0.926 and 0.98 respectively, 
indicating a significant persistence. The result that the illiquidity level in stock 
market is persistent is consistent with a number of previous studies. (Amihud, 
2002; Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2000;  Huberman and Halka, 1999;  
Pastor and Stambaugh, 2001).  
Because the level of illiquidity is persistent, using it to test the co-movement 
between REITs’ illiquidity and common stocks’ illiquidity would have statistic 
problems associated with persistence (Chordia, 2000). Instead, I use the daily 
change of illiquidity to test whether REIT illiquidity co-moves with the stock 
market. The stationary tests for illiquidity change are reported in Table 4.4. Based 
on the Figure 4.2, the level of change is tested without trend and constant. The 
coefficients α  for change of REITs and common stocks illiquidity are -1.696 and 
-4.344 respectably. They are stationary at the 1% significance level. 
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Figure 4- 2 Daily Variation of Illiquidity in REITs and the Stock Market (1993-2008) 
Note: For every REIT firm, the daily change of illiquidity (log transform) is 
calculated. The market change of illiquidity is the daily equal-weighted average of 
the change of illiquidity of all the stocks (common stocks and REITs) listed in 
NYSE.  
 
4.2.2 Time varying systematic illiquidity across REITs and stock market 
This section tests the systematic illiquidity, which has been defined as the co-
movement between REITs’ illiquidity and stock market’s illiquidity (Chordia, 
2000). 
Various approaches have been used in previous literature to test systematic 
illiquidity, including 'market model' (Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam, 2000; 
Kamara, 2008), principal component analysis (Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2001; 
Huberman and Halka, 2001), and Granger causality analysis (Subrahmanyam, 
2007). Of these, the simple 'market model' by Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam 
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(2000) is most suitable for this study. In the simple ‘market model’, individual 
illiquidity for every REIT firm is regressed on market-wide illiquidity. As this 
dissertation’s theoretical analysis focuses on the co-movement between REIT 








>  (see Chapter 3), the 
time series regression on co-movement fits my theoretical analysis very well. 
Following Chordia et al. (2000), the time-series regression for each REIT firm is 
conducted. Chordia et al. (2000) only tests for data throughout 1992, but the 
sample in this dissertation ranges from 1993 to 2008. As the co-movement seems 
to vary over time (Kamara, Lou and Sadka, 2008 ), the time series model is 
regressed year by year. Then I can get the liquidity ,i tθ  for every REIT firm i  in 
every year t from 1993 to 2008. 
, , , , ,i d i t i t m d i dλ α θ λ ε∆ = + ∆ +  
4- 4 
where ,i tθ  denotes the co-movement across REIT firm i ’s illiquidity and stock 
market’s illiquidity level in year t. Like Chordia (2000), the change of illiquidity 
,i dλ∆  rather than illiquidity level ,i dλ is used to avoid statistic problems associated 
with non-stationary. 
Table 4.5 reports the cross-sectional average of ,i tθ  (Average ,i tθ ), the median of 
,i tθ  (Median ,i tθ ), the percentage of ,i tθ  which is positive (% pos), the percentage 
of ,i tθ which is significant at 5% level (% sig), the cross-sectional average of 
2R  
(Average 2R  ), and the percentage of institutional investment on REITs (INS). 
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The average of ,i tθ  ranges from 0.73 to 1.09, indicating a close co-movement 
between the illiquidity of REITs and that of the stock market. As expected, the 
majority of the linkage is positive. The percentage of positive ,i tθ  ranges from 
78.63% to 97.32%. The stock market can explain 1.8% to 13.9% of time series 
variation of REITs’ illiquidity. 
The result also shows that the positive association between REITs’ illiquidity and 
the stock market’s illiquidity increased from 1993 to 2008. The percentage of 
positive ,i tθ  and the percentage of ,i tθ  which is significant at 5% level are 78.63% 
and 32.82% in 1993 respectively. However, these numbers increased to 95.07% 
and 90.14% in 2008. 
The increases of the co-variation between REITs’ illiquidity and stock market’s 
illiquidity could be due to the increase of institutional investments in REITs. 
Table 4.5 includes a column reporting the percentage of institutional investment in 
REITs. Since 1993, the REIT industry has undergone tremendous growth in 
institutional investments. The percentage of institutional investments has 
increased from 33.4% in 1993 to 72.1% in 2008. The increasing investments of 
institutional investors in REITs will increase correlated trading desire and thus 
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Table 4- 5 Results of Systematic Illiquidity across REITs and Stock Market 
 N Average ,i t
θ  Median ,i tθ  % pos % sig Average 2R  INS 
1993 131 0.874 0.95 78.63 32.82 0.053 0.334 
1994 175 0.771 0.813 82.86 34.86 0.034 0.45 
1995 181 0.802 0.881 81.22 38.67 0.04 0.469 
1996 187 0.982 0.889 90.91 49.73 0.046 0.446 
1997 203 0.767 0.778 87.19 48.28 0.036 0.478 
1998 205 0.734 0.744 86.83 42.44 0.022 0.452 
1999 197 0.991 0.871 86.8 27.92 0.018 0.444 
2000 187 0.728 0.87 89.84 48.13 0.029 0.415 
2001 174 0.987 1.034 95.98 79.89 0.065 0.431 
2002 171 0.784 0.802 91.81 71.35 0.035 0.524 
2003 189 0.868 0.96 89.95 70.37 0.037 0.562 
2004 195 1.102 1.203 93.85 78.97 0.043 0.642 
2005 190 0.967 1.105 96.32 82.11 0.058 0.662 
2006 172 1.090 1.215 95.93 81.98 0.064 0.725 
2007 149 1.066 1.137 97.32 91.95 0.1 0.732 
2008 142 0.932 1.083 95.07 90.14 0.14 0.721 
        Note: This table reports the time series systematic illiquidity across REITs and common 
stocks. For every REIT firm, the change of individual illiquidity level is regressed on 
market-wide change of illiquidity. The cross-sectional average of ,i tθ  (Average ,i tθ  ), 
median of ,i tθ  (Median ,i tθ  ), percentage of positive ,i tθ  (% pos), percentage of ,i tθ  which 
is significant at 5% level (% sig), cross-sectional average of 2R  (Average 2R  ), and 
percentage of institutional investment on REITs (INS) are reported. 
 
4.2.3 Systematic Illiquidity in Up and Down Markets 
Increasing evidence suggests that systematic illiquidity is stronger in a down 
market than in an up market. For example, during the 1987 financial crisis, 
illiquidity decreased dramatically and prevailed even after stock prices recovered 
(Amihud, Mendelson and Wood, 1990). The decline in illiquidity is market-wide 
rather than firm-specific. This suggests that there are common factors which 
influence illiquidity across various assets. This section tests whether the positive 
association between REIT’s illiquidity and the stock market’s illiquidity is 
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stronger in a down market.  
Data for Determining Up and Down Markets 
I picked four variables to capture different market conditions. This set of variables 
includes; Business Cycle (BC), Inflation (INF), Market Return (MR) and Market 
Volatility (MV). I report the sources of the data, and how they separate up and 
down markets. Table 4.6 reports the descriptive statistics of the key variables 
defining up and down markets. 
Table 4- 6 Summary Statistics and Correlation  
for Variables in Defining Up and Down Markets 
  Market Return Market Volatility Inflation 
Mean  0.005  0.012  0.002  
Min 0.010  0.011  0.002  
Max 0.097  0.062  0.012  
Correlation 
 Market Return Market Volatility Inflation 
Market Return 1.000    
Market Volatility -0.379  1.000   
Inflation 0.054  -0.317  1.000  
The table presents the average (Mean), minimum (Min) and Maximal (Max) of 
the variables in defining up and down markets. Market Return is the SP500 
monthly return; Market Volatility is computed as the standard deviation of 
SP500 daily returns during a month; Inflation is calculated as the percentage 
change of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) in the U.S. 
 
 
 Market Return  
I adopt Chatrath (2000)'s definition of up and down markets based on comparing 
market return (SP500 return) and risk-free rate (thirty-day T-Bill rate). The SP500 
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return in my sample ranges from -16.9% to 9.7%, while the risk-free rate ranges 
from 0 to 0.5%. The market is an up market when the SP500 return is greater than 
the thirty-day T-Bill rate (SP500 excess return is positive). 
 Market Volatility  
The standard deviation of SP500 daily returns within a month is computed as the 
volatility in that month. The volatility in my sample period ranges from 0.003 to 
0.062, and has a mean of 0.013. A high volatility period means that the volatility 
at month t is higher than the average of volatility (0.013) in my sample period. 
 Inflation  
The percentage change in the Consumer Price Index (All Urban Consumers) in the 
U.S. is used to measure inflation. The rate of inflation in my sample period ranges 
from -0.019 to 0.002. High inflation means the rate of inflation at month t is 
higher than the average of inflation rate (0.204%) in my sample period. 
 Business Cycle  
I adopt the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)’s definition of up and 
down markets. The NBER identities the month when the economy reaches a peak 
and the month when the economy reaches a trough. The time from peak to 
through is an up market, and the time from through to peak is a down market. 
Specifically, the up market has the periods of January 1993 to March 2001 and 
December 2001 to November 2007, and the down market has the periods of April 
2001 to November 2001 and December 2007 to December 2008. The term 
‘business cycle’ is a broad expression of macroeconomic activity which includes 
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the product and income sides, economy-wide employment, and real income. 
Table 4- 7 Descriptive Statistics for Up and Down Markets 
  Mean Min Max Std Number of Months 
Inflation 
Up 0.003 0.001 0.012 0.002 145 
Down -0.002 -0.019 0.000 0.004 46 
       
Market 
Return 
High 0.030 -0.020 0.097 0.023 117 
Low -0.036 -0.169 0.006 0.033 74 
       
Market 
Volatility 
Up 0.019 0.012 0.062 0.008 120 
Down 0.009 0.003 0.012 0.002 71 






Note: This table reports descriptive statistics of the key variables defining up and down 
markets. Inflation is calculated as the percentage change of Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) in the U.S.; Market Return is the SP500 monthly return; Market Volatility is 
computed as the standard deviation of SP500 daily returns during a month. 
 
Empirical Results of Systematic Illiquidity in Up and Down Markets 
Previous literature suggests that systematic illiquidity tends to increase in 
declining markets. (Chatrath, Liang and McIntosh, 2000; Chiang, Lee and Wisen, 
2004). Amihud (1990) suggests that in declining markets, investors will revise 
their expectation of illiquidity, and tend to have a stronger demand for liquidity. 
The increasing demand for liquidity within the market will lead to market-wide 
systematic liquidity. 
Market volatility has been modeled in various literature (Chordia, Roll, and 
Subrahmanyam, 2000; Vayanos, 2004; Kamara, Lou and Sadka, 2008) as a 
determinant for systematic illiquidity. Market volatility influences the market 
wide inventory risk, and causes correlated institutional trading across different 
assets. Market volatility also changes the information environment in the stock 
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market, and causes correlated information asymmetry across various assets. Both 
effects will lead to increasing systematic illiquidity. 
The business cycle, on the other hand, reflects the real output growth. While the 
business cycle is not directly subject to the stock market, it has been found to be a 
primary factor that drives fluctuations in trading activities (Officer, 1973 and Lin, 
1996). Given that fluctuations in trading will influence market-wide inventory and 
the information environment, I expect a high systematic illiquidity in a recession 
period. 
Inflation is another variable which may influence systematic illiquidity. There are 
two effects. (1) Fisher Effect: holding the real interest rate constant, the increase 
of nominal interest rate is proportional to the expected inflation rate. Given that 
inventory cost is increasing with the interest rate, the high inflation rate indicates a 
market-wide high inventory risk. Therefore, systematic illiquidity will be higher 
when the inflation rate is high. (2) Money Illusion: investors cannot distinguish 
whether the changes in nominal prices are due to changes in real values or to 
inflation (Brunnermeier and Julliard, 2008). The money illusion will not influence 
informed traders who have the private information about asset’s fundamental price, 
but will influence uninformed traders. Therefore, during high inflation, there will 
be greater information asymmetry between informed traders and uninformed 
traders across the whole market, leading to a higher systematic illiquidity.  
The empirical specification to test systematic illiquidity in up and down markets is 
similar to equation 4.4, but includes two dummy variables (up uD  and down dD  
or high hD  and low lD ): 
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, , , , , ,* *i d i i u m u u i d m d d i dD Dλ α θ λ θ λ ε∆ = + ∆ + ∆ +  
4- 5 
Where uD  and dD  are dummy variables to denote different market conditions. uD  
equals one (zero) if market is rising (declining). dD  equals one (zero) if market is 
declining (rising). When estimating with volatility and inflation, the dummy 
variables change to hD  and lD . lD  equals one (zero) if the variable is low (high). 
hD  equals one (zero) if the variable is high (low). 
Table 4- 8 Systematic Illiquidity in Up and Down Markets 
 Intercept 
Average ,i uθ  Average ,i dθ  2R  t( ,i uθ = ,i dθ ) 
Market 
Return 
0.004 0.886 0.878 0.037 0.219 
(0.041) (0.273) (0.275)   
      Market 
Volatility 
0.003 0.898 0.802 0.037 2.595 
(0.041) (0.263) (0.260)   
      
GDP 
0.004 0.869 0.705 0.039 4.345 
(0.041) (0.211) (0.238)   
      
Inflation 0.004 0.835 0.903 0.037 -2.512 (0.041) (0.393) (0.236)   
Note: This table reports the results of model 4.5 in up and down markets. The model is 
similar as model 4.4 but has two dummy variables uD  and dD to denote different 
market conditions. uD  equals one (zero) if market is rising (declining). dD  equals one 
(zero) if market is declining (rising). When estimating with volatility and inflation, the 
dummy variables change to hD  and lD . lD  equals one (zero) if the variable is low 
(high). hD  equals one (zero) if the variable is high (low).  
Cross-sectional average of t-statistics for ,i uθ  and ,i dθ  are reported in parentheses.  
 
Results are reported in Table 4-8. As expected, the systematic illiquidity is higher 
when the market return is declining, the volatility is high, macroeconomic is in 
recession and when inflation is high. The cross-sectional average of coefficients in 
declining markets is 0.886, which is slightly higher than 0.878  in up markets. The 
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average of coefficients is 0.898 when volatility is high and 0.802 when volatility 
is low. The hypothesis that coefficients are the same in different volatility 
conditions can be rejected at the 5% significant level (t-statistic is 2.595). The 
difference between the coefficients in a boom period (0.869) and in a recession 
period (0.705) is largest. This can be caused by the influence of fluctuations in 
GDP growth on the stock market fluctuations.  Finally, systematic illiquidity iθ  is 
0.903 in a high inflation period but 0.835 in a low inflation period. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis based on fisher effect and money illusion theories. 
4.3 Conclusion 
Using daily absolute return divided by dollar trading volume to measure illiquidity 
(Amihud, 2002), this dissertation looks at the illiquidity measures for a sample of 
174 REITs and 7248 common stocks from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 2008. 
It is found that REITs were relatively illiquid compared with common stocks, 
where the pooled average of illiquidity in the sample period is 1.35 for REITs and 
0.81 for common stocks. However, the illiquidity index for REITs has 
dramatically declined from 4.61 in 1993 to 0.87 in 1998. The increased liquidity 
has made REITs a more attractive investment vehicle in the financial market.  
This dissertation also tests whether REIT firm’s illiquidity co-moves with the 
stock market’s illiquidity. By regressing every REIT firm’s illiquidity on the stock 
market’s illiquidity (Chordia, 2002), the result shows that the cross-sectional 
average of coefficients ranges from 0.73 to 1.09, which indicates a close co-
movement between REIT’s illiquidity and the illiquidity of stock market. The co-
movement suggests that market-wide illiquidity has a common effect on REITs.  
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Moreover, the co-movement relationship is time varying. The co-movement is 
higher when market return is declining, volatility is high, the macroeconomy is in 
recession and inflation is high. This indicates the importance of studying the 
mispricing-illiquidity relationship separately in up and down markets.  
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5 REITs Mispricing and Market-Wide Illiquidity 
In this chapter, I test the implications discussed in Chapter 4. I provide the 
evidence that mispricing of REITs indeed has a positive relationship with stock 
market illiquidity. Also, I show that market illiquidity has a stronger effect on 
mispricing in a declining market than in an up market. 
5.1 Measuring Mispricing 
To study the relationship between mispricing and illiquidity, a measure of REIT’s 
mispricing is needed. The computation of mispricing of every REIT firm is 
following Chordia, Huh and Subrahmanyam (2009). Mispricing is defined as the 
difference between the actual asset return and the expected fundamental return: 
 
5- 1 




 is the 
fundamental return of REIT firm i  in month t.  
Fundamental return is assumed to follow the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). 
Capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is specified as  
*
, , , ,(Re Re ) *(Re Re )i t f t i m t f tE β− = −  
5- 2 
where *,Rei t  is the fundamental return for asset i in time t; ,Re f t  is the risk free 
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rate in time t; iβ  is the factor loading for asset i; and , ,Re Rem t f t−  is the market 
excess return (risk premium). 
The normal way to compute the expected risk-adjusted return following the 
CAPM is to get factor loading iˆβ  from regressing asset return on market excess 
return. Then the expected risk-adjusted return is calculated as the product of the 
estimated factor loading and risk premium. 
*
, , , ,
ˆ(Re Re ) *(Re Re )i t f t i m t f tE β− = −  
5- 3 
Then the mispricing (denoted as 1M  if it is computed from the CAPM) is the 




Given that mispricing is highly dependent on the choice of the asset pricing model, 
this dissertation adds another two widely used systematic risk factors, namely the 
size factor (SMB), and the value factor (HML) to do robust test. Similarly, the 
fundamental return is computed as: 
* 1 2 3
, , , ,
ˆˆˆ(Re Re ) *(Re Re ) * *HMLi t f t i m t f t i iE SMBβ β β− = − + +  
5- 5 
where *,Rei t is the fundamental return for asset i in time t; ,Re f t  is the risk free rate 
in time t; iˆβ  is the factor loading for asset i; SMB (HML) is the risk premium of 
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small size portfolio (high book-to-market ratio portfolio). 
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5.1.1 Data for Measuring Mispricing 
The variables used in the CAPM and the FF3 models are monthly return of REIT 
firm i  ( Rei ), risk free rate ( Re f ), monthly market return ( Rem ), the size factor 
(SMB), and the value factor (HML). All variables are obtained from the CRSP for 
the period of January 1993 to December 2008. The summary statistics are 
reported in Table 7.  
Table 5- 1 Descriptive Statistics for Variables 
in CAPM and Fama-French Three Factor Model 
Variable  Mean Median Min Max Std Dev 
Rei  0.005  0.004  -0.943  2.903  0.111  
Rem  0.007  0.014  -0.185  0.084  0.044  
SMB 0.002  -0.002  -0.169  0.220  0.038  
HML 0.004  0.003  -0.124  0.139  0.034  
Re f  0.003  0.004  0.000  0.006  0.001  
Note: This table reports descriptive statistics of the key variables in 
decomposing mispricing. The variables include monthly return of REIT 
firm i  ( Rei ) risk free rate ( Re f ), market return ( Rem ), size factor (SMB), 
value factor (HML). All the variables are obtained from CRSP dataset for 
the period of Jan.1993 to Dec.1993. 
 
Definition of Variables Used in CAPM and FF3 Models 
 Return of REIT Firm i  ( Rei ): monthly return of individual firm i  
 Risk Free Rate ( Re f ): thirty-days T-Bill rate 
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 Market Return ( Rem ): monthly market portfolio return 
 Size Factor (SMB): return premium of portfolio with small size stocks over 
portfolio with big size stocks 
 Value Factor (HML): return premium of portfolio with high book-to-market 
value stocks over portfolio with low book-to-market value stocks 
5.1.2 Results of CAPM and FF3 Models 
Table 5-2 reports the regression results of CAPM and FF3 models. Panel A shows 
that on average 11% variation of REIT’s actual return can be captured by common 
risk factors that are associated with market excess return. Panel B shows that on 
average 22.5% variation of REIT’s actual return can be explained by common risk 
factors that are associated with market excess return, market capitalization, and 
book-to-market value. This suggests that fluctuation in REIT’s return cannot be 
fully captured by changes in fundamentals, so mispricing is necessary to be 
studied. 
Table 5-3 presents the descriptive statistics of mispricing and fundamental returns in 
REITs. The pooled average of mispricing from CAPM ( 1M ) is -0.12%，and the pooled 
average of mispricing from FF3 ( 2M ) is -0.62%. The maximum mispricing measureof 
REITs is 13.2% ( 1M ) and 12.4% ( 2M ). The correlation between the two mispricing 
measures is 0.768, which is significant at the 1% level. The close relationship between 
two mispricing measures indicates that, even after controlling for size and book-to-market 
value effects in M2, mispricing still exists. 
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Table 5- 2 Coefficient Estimates from Standard CAPM and FF3 
 Panel A  Panel B 
 Standard CAPM  FF3 
 Average Median Std Dev  Mean Median Std Dev 
 iˆβ  iˆβ  iˆβ   iˆβ  iˆβ  iˆβ  
Intercept -0.005 -0.001 0.017  -0.008 -0.005 0.020 
 (-0.231)    (-0.810)   
Re Rem f−  0.644 0.493 0.595  0.814 0.664 0.620 
 (2.999)    (3.814)   SMB     0.408 0.456 0.778 
     (2.145)   HML     0.899 0.801 0.891 
     (3.049)   
Average of 
2R  
0.111    0.225   
        Note: This table presents the empirical results of model 5.4 and model 5.6. For every REIT 
firm i, two models are regressed for the sample period Jan 1993 to Dec 2008. The average 
of coefficients (Average iˆβ ), median of coefficients (Median iˆβ ), standard deviation of 
coefficients (Std Dev iˆβ ), average of t-statistics (in parentheses), and average of 
2R  are 
reported. 
 
Table 5- 3 Descriptive Statistics for Mispricing in REITs 
 
 Mean Median Min 
Max 
1M  (CAPM) -0.00119 -0.00039 -0.163 0.132 
2M  (FF3) -0.00622 -0.00598 -0.098 0.124 
Observed ,Rei t  0.00333 0.00702 -0.314 0.152 
 Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
 
Mispricing (CAPM) 0.038 -0.767 6.150  
Mispricing (FF3) 0.029 0.243 5.394  
Observed ,Rei t  0.049 -2.183 14.11  
Correlation 
( 1M , 2M ) 
0.768***    
(16.523)    
Note: This table presents the average (Mean), median (Median), minimum (Min), 
maximum (Max), Standard Deviation (Std Dev), Skewness and Kurtosis of 
mispricing components estimated from model 5.4 (M1) and model 5.6 (M2). The 
market observed return (Observed ,Rei t ) is also reported to compare with 
mispricing measure ( 1M and 2M ). 
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5.2 Regressions of Mispricing on Market Illiquidity 
Using the estimates of mispricing on every REIT firm, it is able to test whether 
market illiquidity can explain mispricing in REITs. The mispricing of a REIT firm 
is regressed on one-month lagged stock market illiquidity using a panel dataset 
which includes 173 REIT firms’ monthly returns from January 1993 to December 
2008. I determine to use only one-month lag because stock market illiquidity is 
persistent (see the attributes of illiquidity measure in Chapter 4) thus additional 
lags of illiquidity will not provide additional explanation powers. I also use firm 
size as a control variable because size is found to be related to mispricing. Banz 
(1981) and Reinganum (1981) find that portfolios of stocks with small market 
capitalization tend to have higher expected returns than stocks with large market 
capitalization. 
Besides systematic illiquidity and size, REIT mispricing may result from 
fluctuations in other variables.  Brunnermeier and Julliard (2008) argue that 
mispricing arises as a result of money illusion. Others like Baker and Wurgler 
(2003) argue that investor sentiment and limited arbitrage are the two sources of 
mispricing. The model in this dissertation doesn’t include these factors because 
illiquidity has already reflected them. For instance, when some traders are 
irrational, or they cannot distinguish whether prices changes are due to changes in 
real values or due to inflation, they are uninformed. The existence of uninformed 
traders will lead to illiquidity (Kyle, 1985). Because investor sentiment is one of 
the sources of illiquidity, one cannot therefore separately identify the effects of 
investor sentiments and systematic illiquidity on REIT mispricing. 
The general model of the panel regression is given by: 
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, 1 , 1 2 , 1 ,* *ln( )i t m t i t i tM d Sizeµ λ µ υ− −= + + +  
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where ,i tM  is the mispricing component estimated from equation 5.4 (CAPM) and 
equation 5.6 (FF3); , 1m tλ −  is the lagged market illiquidity; , 1ln( )i tSize −  is  the log 
form of stock size, a control variable for mispricing. The parameter 1µ  denotes the 
coefficient of , 1m tλ − , which indicates the influence of stock market illiquidity on 
REITs mispricing. The theoretical analysis in this dissertation (see Chapter 3) 
assumes that 1 0µ >  because price information cannot fully be incorporated into a 
REIT’s price immediately when market illiquidity exists.   
5.2.1 Fixed Effect Model 
The firm and time-fixed effects are used to control for unobserved factors that 
could affect mispricing and market illiquidity. Take funding constraints as an 
example of unobserved factor, funding of informed traders potentially affects 
mispricing since informed traders with funding constraints are less likely to 
arbitrage against mispricing (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2008). At the same time, 
funding constraints could be correlated with market illiquidity as funding 
constraints increase the market-wide inventory risk and thus increase market 
illiquidity. 
The fixed effect model is chosen over the random effect model because the 
Hausman (1978) test shows a strong preference towards a fixed effect model. The 
Chi-Sq. of the Hausman test is 248.78 when the dependent variable is M1 and 
212.50 when the dependent variable is M2. The null hypothesis that the random 
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effect fits better than the fixed effect model is rejected at the 1% level of 
significance.  
Table 5- 4 Empirical Results of Fixed Effect Models 
 
Panel A             Panel B 
Dependent Variable 1M  (CAPM) Dependent Variable 2M  (FF3) 
 1 2 1 2 
Intercept -0.586*** 0.294** -0.757*** 14.815* 
 (-5.904) (2.227) （-8.047） （1.929） 
, 1m tλ −  0.542*** 0.244** 0.136 2.644 
 (5.064) (2.051) （1.337） （0.272） 
, 1ln( )i tSize −   0.000***  -1.341*** 
  （-5.378）  （-16.062） 
     
2R  0.016 0.016 0.019 0.136 
Adjusted 2R   0.007 0.007 0.010 0.122 
F 1.749 1.754 2.086 10.000 
Note: This table presents the empirical results of fix models. The dependent variable in 
Panel A is the mispricing estimated from CAPM, and in panel B is the mispricing from FF3 
model. There are 174 cross-sections and 192 time series. The cross-sectional and time series 
effects are not reported here. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
Table 5.4 presents the results of fixed effect models. The dependent variable in 
Panel A is the mispricing estimated from the CAPM (M1), and in panel B is the 
mispricing from the FF3 model (M2). Lagged market illiquidity is positively 
related to both measures of mispricing. The coefficient of lagged market 
illiquidity is 0.244 for mispricing estimated from CAPM at the 5% level of 
significance. The coefficient of lagged market illiquidity is even greater (2.644) 
for mispricing estimated from FF3, but the estimation is not significant with a t-
statistic of 0.272. The coefficient of size is negative (ranges from -0.001 to -1.341) 
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at the 1% level of significance, which indicates that REITs with large market 
capitalization are less likely to be mispriced.  
This is only a preliminary test because the results may be biased as a result of 
endogeneity problem. The strict exogeneity assumption in panel regression states 
that the residual ,i tυ  in model 5-7 should be uncorrelated with dependent variable 
,1mλ  at any time in the sample period T: 
1 ,1 ,2 ,( | , ,..., ) 0m m m TE µ λ λ λ =  
5- 8 
However, in the above estimation 5-7, the dependent variable mispricing could 
have an effect on independent variable market illiquidity. Consider an uninformed 
trader who predicts stock prices based on previous prices. If stocks were 
mispriced in the last period, the uninformed trader who determines asset price 
based on historic price information is likely to predict an inaccurate price in the 
next trading. This information disadvantage will cause higher illiquidity in the 
stock market (Kyle, 1985). Thus the lagged mispricing tends to increase the 
market illiquidity. Also, measures of mispricing in my sample are negatively 
related to their lagged value. The correlation between M1 (M2) and its one-period 
lagged value is -0.182 (-0.108). This is because investors will revise their 
expectations on asset prices (Bray, 1982; Glosten and Lawrence, 1985). Given 
that lagged mispricing tends to positively predict market illiquidity and negatively 
predict mispricing, the endogeneity problem will lead to a downward bias of 
estimations: the coefficient of market illiquidity should be higher than estimated. 
Later section tests the endogeneity problem and estimates the model after 
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eliminating the effects of endogeneity.  
5.2.2 Endogeneity Test 
Instruments 
Hausman (1978), Davidson and Mackinnon (1989, 1993) provide an approach to 
test for endogeneity. The first step is to find instrumental variables iz  for the 
suspect variable , 1m tλ − .  
Empirically, previous literature has suggested a few variables that could affect 
illiquidity (e.g., Bhasin, Cole and Kiely, 1997; Nelling, 1995; Clayton and 
MacKinnon, 2000), including lagged value of endogenous variable ( mλ ), return 
volatility (VOLA), number of analysts following (AY) and percentage of 
institutional investment (INS). Return volatility increases the inventory risk of 
market makers thus increasing the assets' illiquidity. The number of analysts 
following (AY) and the percentage of institutional investment (INS) indicate the 
activity of informed traders. When the ratio of informed traders to uninformed 
ones is high, market makers will require higher compensation against the loss to 
informed traders and the stocks are more illiquid (Glosten, 1985). The one-period 
lagged value of these variables and market illiquidity are chosen as instrumental 
variables in endogeneity. The summary statistics of these variables is presented in 
table 11.  
 Size ( ln( )Size ): log transform of market capitalization, which equals the 
product of price and trading volume. 
 Return volatility (VOLA): standard deviation of daily return in a given month 
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 Number of analysts following (AY): the sum of the number of analysts 
following a REIT in a given month. The data is from Thomson-Reuters 
I/B/E/S. 
 Percentage of institutional investment (INS): the sum of shares invested by 
institutions divided by the total number of shares outstanding in a given 
month. The data is from Thomson-Reuters Institutional (13F) Holdings 
Database. 
The correlation of the instrument variables with the lagged market illiquidity and 
two mispricing measures is presented in Table 12. All of the four instruments 
(two-period lagged) are correlated with market illiquidity (one-period lagged) at 
the 1% significance level. Especially, the correlation between lagged market 
illiquidity and its current value is 0.976, which shows a high persistence of market 
illiquidity measure. Among the four instruments, only two-period lagged market 
illiquidity has a high correlation with mispricing measures. (0.389 for CAPM 
mispricing, and 0.165 for FF3 mispricing). This correlation may be caused by the 
persistence of the illiquidity measure.  
Good instrument variables should explain the suspect endogenous independent 
variable, but provide no marginal explanation power for the dependent variable 
(Hausman, 1978). The following two models are regressed to test whether the four 
variables are good instruments: 
, 1 0 1 , 2 2 , 2 3 , 2 4 , 2 , 1* * * n( ) *m t m t i t i t i t m tVOLA L AY INSλ δ δ λ δ δ δ κ− − − − − −= + + + + +  
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, 1 , 1 2 , 2 3 , 2 4 , 2 5 , 2 ,* * * * n( ) *i t m t m t i t i t i t i tM d VOLA L AY INSµ λ µ λ µ µ µ ε− − − − −= + + + + + +
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where lagged market illiquidity ( , 1m tλ − ) is first regressed on the four instruments 
(two-period lagged), then mispricing measures ( ,i tM ) are regressed on the four 
instruments along with lagged market illiquidity.  
The regression results in Table 5-7 show that the instruments can explain market 
illiquidity (Panel A), but provide little additional explanation for mispricing 
(Panel B). In Panel A, the two-period lagged market illiquidity can predict lagged 
market illiquidity, with a coefficient of 0.936 and the t-statistic of 29.955. Both 
volatility (VOLA) and the percentage of institutional investment in REIT firms 
(INS) positively predict market illiquidity because they would increase market 
wide inventory risk and the correlated demand for liquidity. The coefficients of 
VOLA and INS are 1.409 and 0.037 respectively. Previous literature predicts that 
the number of analysts following n( )L AY  will also increase systematic illiquidity 
because it indicates the activity of informed traders and the degree of information 
asymmetry. However, the coefficient of n( )L AY  here is -0.009. This may be 
caused by the effect of REIT size. The REITs with large number of analysts may 
also have large market capitalization, and large REITs tend to be more liquid. The 
negative coefficient of n( )L AY  is expected to convert to positive after REIT size 
is added. The test is conducted in model 5-10. Panel B reports that instrument 
variables cannot provide additional explanation for mispricing, where none of the 
four instruments is significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 5- 5 Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Panel Regression 
   Mean  Median  Max  Min Std.Dev. 
n( )L Size  13.326  13.305  16.650  7.447  1.221  
VOLA 0.017  0.013  0.480  0.001  0.017  
Ln(AY) 4.079  4.159  7.598  0.000  1.596  
INS  0.540  0.557  1.000  0.000  0.266  
Note: This table reports descriptive statistics of the key variables in panel 
regression. The variables include log form of market capitalization ( n( )L Size ), 
standard deviation of daily return (VOLA), log form of number of analysts 
following ( n( )L AY ), the percentage of institutional investment (INS). 
n( )L Size and VOLA are obtained from the CRSP dataset. Ln(AY) is from 
Thomson-Reuters I/B/E/S, and INS is computed from Thomson-Reuters 
Institutional (13F) Holdings Database. 
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Table 5- 6 Correlation Matrix for Variables in Panel Regression 
 1M  2M  , 1m tλ −   , 1n( )i tL Size −   , 2m tλ −   , 2i tVOLA −   , 2n( )i tL AY −   , 2i tINS −   
1M   1.000         
2M  0.768  1.000        
 (16.523)         
, 1m tλ −   0.339  0.175  1.000       
 （5.934）  （3.068）        
, 1n( )i tL Size −   -0.257  -0.259  -0.103  1.000      
 （-4.498）  （-4.534）  （-2.793）       
, 2m tλ −  0.389  0.165  0.976  -0.364  1.000     
 （3.884）  （1.650）  （451.123）  （-39.069）      
, 2i tVOLA −   0.058  0.037  0.375  -0.148  0.610  1.000    
 （5.776）  （3.701）  3.746  -14.954  6.105     
, 2n( )i tL AY −   0.030  0.015  -0.541  0.500  -0.533  0.146  1.000   
 （3.043）  （1.512）  -64.287  57.612  -62.817  1.684    
, 2i tINS −  0.045  0.034  -0.267  0.515  -0.270  -0.031  0.359  1.000  
  （4.485）  （3.359）  -27.621  60.032  -27.939  -1.086  38.383    
Note: This table reports the correlation of the instrument variables with the endogenous variable lagged market illiquidity , 1m tλ −  and two mispricing measures 
1M and 2M . The variables include log form of market capitalization n( )L Size , standard deviation of daily return (VOLA), log form of number of analysts 
following Ln(AY), percentage of institutional investment (INS). 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 5- 7  Test of Instruments  
Panel A Panel B 
 
, 1 0 1 , 2 2 , 2
3 , 2 4 , 2 , 1
* *
* n( ) *
m t m t i t
i t i t m t
VOLA
L AY INS




= + + +
+ +   
 
, 1 , 1 2 , 2 3 , 2
4 , 2 5 , 2 ,
* * *
* n( ) *
i t m t m t i t
i t i t i t
M d VOLA
L AY INS




= + + +
+ + +  
Dependent Variable: , 1m tλ −  Dependent Variable 1M  2M  
     Intercept 0.766***  C -0.002  -0.009**  
 (7.344)   (-0.444)  (-2.071)  
, 2m tλ −  0.936***  , 1m tλ −  0.112*  0.077*  
 (29.955)   (1.966)  (1.768)  
, 2i tVOLA −  1.409***  , 2m tλ −  0.006  0.010  
 (18.051)   (0.763)  (1.417)  
, 2n( )i tL AY −  -0.009***  , 2i tVOLA −  0.127  0.067  
 (-8.135)   (1.642)  (0.925)  
, 2i tINS −  0.037***  , 2n( )i tL AY −  0.000  0.000  
 (-4.811)    (-0.042)  (-0.042)  
  , 2i t
INS −  0.007  0.004  
   (1.291)  (0.714)  
     R-squared 0.949  R-squared 0.281  0.285  
Adjusted R-squared 0.948  Adjusted R-squared 0.117  0.120  
Note: The objective of this regression is to see whether the four variables: two-period lagged 
market illiquidity ( , 2m tλ − ), volatility ( , 2i tVOLA − ), analyst following ( , 2n( )i tL AY − ), percentage 
of institutional investments ( , 2i tINS − ) are good instruments. In panel A, lagged market 
illiquidity ( , 1m tλ −  ) is first regressed on the four instruments (two-period lagged). In panel B,  
mispricing measure ( 1M  or 2M ) is regressed on the four instruments along with lagged market 
illiquidity. 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 




The Hausman-Wu test (Wu, 1973; Hausman, 1978) is adopted to see whether the 
dependent variable 1M (or 2M ) and independent variable , 1m tλ −  have endogeneity 
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problems. The test includes two steps:  
, 1 0 1 , 1 2 , 2 3 , 2
4 , 2 5 , 2 , 1
*ln( ) * *
* n( ) *
m t i t m t i t
i t i t m t
Size VOLA
L AY INS mu
λ δ δ δ λ δ
δ δ
− − − −
− − −
= + + +
+ + +
 
, 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 ,* ln( ) * *i t i t m t m t i tM d Size muµ µ λ µ ε− − −= + + + +  
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where the first step is to regress suspect independent variable ( , 1m tλ − ) on control 
variable , 1ln( )i tSize −  and all the instruments ( , 2m tλ − , , 2i tVOLA − , , 2n( )i tL AY − , , 2i tINS − ) 
and save the estimated residuals ( , 1m tmu − ); the second step is to regress dependent 
variable ( ,i tM ) on suspect independent variable ( , 1m tλ − ) and the residual ( , 1m tmu − ) 
estimated from step one. Hausman (1978) suggests that if the coefficient of the 
residual which is denoted as 3µ  is significant, there is an endogeneity problem.  
Table 5-8 Panel A reports the regression results of step one, and Panel B presents 
the results of step two. The coefficient of residual (denoted as 3µ ) is significant at 
the 0.1 level, where the t-statistic of 3µ  is 1.954 for M1 (CAPM), and 1.846 for M2 
(FF3). This indicates that suspect variable market illiquidity and mispricing really 
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Table 5- 8 Test for Endogeneity 
Panel A Panel B 
 
, 1 0 1 , 1 2 , 2 3 , 2
4 , 2 5 , 2 , 1
*ln( ) * *
* n( ) *
m t i t m t i t
i t i t m t
Size VOLA
L AY INS mu
λ δ δ δ λ δ
δ δ
− − − −
− − −
= + + +
+ + +    
, 1 , 1 2 , 1
3 , 1 ,
* ln( ) *
*
i t i t m t








+ +  
Dependent Variable: , 1m tλ −  Dependent Variable 1M  2M  
     Intercept 0.220*** C -0.002  -0.009**  
 (6.456)  (-0.444)  (-2.071)  
, 2n( )i tL Size −  -0.011*** , 1ln( )i tSize −  -0.001 -0.003** 
 (-4.026)  (-0.619) (-2.728) 
, 2m tλ −  0.923*** , 1m tλ −  0.112*  0.077* 
 (282.077)  (1.966)  (1.768)  
, 2i tVOLA −  1.281*** , 1m tmu −  0.013* 0.006* 
 (12.351)  1.954 1.846 
, 2n( )i tL AY −  -0.014***    
 (-13.748)    
, 2i tINS −  0.016*    
 1.987    
R-squared 0.949  R-squared 0.270 0.291 
Adjusted R-squared 0.948  Adjusted R-squared 0.118 0.134 
Table 5-8 presents the testing results to see whether the dependent variable 1M (or 2M ) and 
independent variable , 1m tλ −  have endogeneity problem. Panel A reports the first step: regress suspect 
independent variable ( , 1m tλ − ) on control variable , 1ln( )i tSize −  and all the instruments 
( , 2m tλ − , , 2i tVOLA − , , 2n( )i tL AY − , , 2i tINS − ) and save residuals ( , 1m tmu − ); Panel B reports the second 
step: regress dependent variable ( ,i tM ) on suspect independent variable ( , 1m tλ − ) and the residual 
( , 1m tmu − ) estimated from step one. Hausman (1978) suggests that if the coefficient of residual which is 
denoted as 3µ  is significant, there is endogeneity problem.  
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
5.2.3 Two Stage Least Square Regression (2SLS) 
To solve the endogeneity problem, two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression is 
used to test whether stock market illiquidity can explain mispricing in REITs.  
The first stage is using instrumental variables to represent market illiquidity, 
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which has already been conducted when I tested whether instruments can explain 
market illiquidity. (See Model 5-9 Table 5-7 Panel A). The second stage is to go 
back to the mispricing model and include the fitted value of market illiquidity 
from the first stage as an independent variable. 
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where  is the fitted value estimated from model 5-9:  
, 1 0 1 , 2 2 , 2 3 , 2 4 , 2 , 1* * * n( ) *m t m t i t i t i t m tVOLA L AY INSλ δ δ λ δ δ δ κ− − − − − −= + + + + +  
Table 5-9 presents the empirical results of the second stage of the 2SLS model. As 
expected, lagged market illiquidity positively predicts individual mispricing. The 
coefficients of , 1m tλ −  are consistent for the mispricing from CAPM (4.973) and 
mispricing from FF3 model (5.326) at the 5% significance level. This result 
suggests that one unit increase in market illiquidity leads to a four to five unit 
increase in REIT mispricing, given that the size of the REIT is constant. The 
coefficients of , 1ln( )i tSize −  are negative as expected since REIT stocks of small 
market capitalization tend to have higher expected returns than the fundamental 
return captured by common risk factors. The 2SLS model fits the data much better 
than the fixed effect model without instrument variables. The adjusted 2R  are 
0.221 and 0.144 in model 1M  and 2M  respectively, while they are only 0.007 and 
0.001 in models without instruments (see table 5.). This indicates the importance 
of including instrumental variables to avoid endogeneity. 
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Table 5- 9 Results for 2SLS model (Second Stage) 
 
 
Dependent Variable 1M  
(CAPM) 
 
Dependent Variable 2M  
(FF3) 
 1 2  1 2 
Intercept -3.581* -3.608*  -3.836* -3.842* 
 (-1.922) (-1.922)  -1.974 -1.973 
, 1ln( )i tSize −   0.002*   0.001 
  (1.947)   (0.064) 
, 1m tλ −  4.978* 4.973*  5.327* 5.326* 
 (1.920)  (1.920)   (1.970)  (1.970)  
      2R  0.246 0.244  0.170 0.170 
Adjusted 2R  0.222 0.221  0.144 0.144 
F-statistic 11.674 11.635  7.866 7.839 
Note: This table presents the results of the second stage of 2SLS. The dependent 
variable: mispricing from CAPM ( 1M ) and mispricing from Fama French Three Factor 
Model ( 2M ) is regressed on predicted value of lagged market illiquidity , 1m tλ −  and log 
form of size , 1ln( )i tSize −  
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
5.3 Mispricing and Market Illiquidity in Up and Down Markets 
In this section I provide evidence that a positive relationship between REIT 
mispricing and illiquidity is more significant in down markets than in up markets. 
Table 5-10 Panel A reports the empirical results with the dependent variable of 
mispricing estimated from CAPM. The asymmetric of illiquidity effect is most 
significant in two sub-samples defined by stock market performance. The 
illiquidity-mispricing relationship is significantly stronger when the market is 
more volatile and when market return is decreasing. The coefficient of , 1m tλ −  is 
49.663 in a market with negative excess return compared with 4.919 in a market 
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with positive excess return. Similarly, the coefficient is 25.598 in a high volatility 
market compared with 4.194 in low volatility market. Similar results are reached 
in Panel B when the dependent variable changes to mispricing estimated from the 
FF3 model. This evidence supports the expectation that market declining and high 
volatility increase the supply and demand of market-wide liquidity, leading to a 
stronger relationship between market illiquidity and REIT mispricing. 
In contrast, the relationship between mispricing and market illiquidity is more 
significant in an up market than in a down market when the sub-samples are 
separated according to business cycle. In Panel A, the coefficient of , 1m tλ −  in a 
down market is negative (-3.273), yet is positive (3.770) in an up market. Panel B 
reflects the same trend. Does this mean that illiquidity has a stronger effect on 
mispricing during expansion periods? The answer is ambiguous since it may be 
due to a bias in defining up and down markets by business cycle. According to the 
NBER definition, the expansion period covers 171 months in this sample, while 
the contraction period only covers 21 months. Moreover, the up market period 
spans from December 2001 to November 2007 and coincides with the period of 
increasing systematic illiquidity across REITs and common stocks. As systematic 
illiquidity is a source for the relationship between market illiquidity and 
mispricing, the high coefficient in a down business cycle period may be due to the 
increasing trend of systematic illiquidity during that period. 
The result for inflation is quite interesting. In general, an up market is likely to 
coincide with increasing inflation. So we would expect a mispricing-illiquidity 
relationship to be more significant in a declining inflation market. However, the 
result shows that a mispricing-illiquidity relationship increases with inflation. The 
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coefficient of , 1m tλ −  is 2.338 in a high inflation rate market relative to -6.936 in a 
low inflation rate market. The result in Panel B is quite consistent. One possible 
reason is that the expected inflation rate increases the nominal interest rate (hold 
real interest rate constant). A high nominal interest rate leads to high market-wide 
inventory risk, and thus higher systematic illiquidity. Another reason is money 
illusion (Brunnermeier and Julliard, 2008). Investors cannot distinguish between 
the real price change and the normal change. Considering the information 
asymmetry theory jointly, uninformed investors will have more information 
disadvantage when money illusion is high, increasing the market-wide 
information asymmetry. Thus the systematic illiquidity will increase and will lead 
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Table 5- 10 Empirical Results of 2SLS Models in Up and Down Markets 
Panel A: dependent variable 1M  (CAPM) 
  Market Return Market Volatility GDP Inflation 
  Up Down Low High Up Down High Low 
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Panel B: dependent variable 2M  (FF3) 
  Market Return Market Volatility GDP Inflation 
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Note: This table presents the empirical results of 2SLS models in up and down markets. t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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6 Conclusion 
6.1 Main Findings and Implications 
This dissertation provides a new way of thinking about the sources of mispricing 
in REITs. Previous literature in REIT illiquidity has focused on the effect of 
individual illiquidity on REIT returns (Nelling et al., 1995; Below, Kiely and 
McIntosh, 1996; Cole and Kiely, 1997; Clayton and MacKinnon 2000); however, 
this dissertation places emphasis on market-wide illiquidity. When market 
illiquidity increases, the individual illiquidity of REIT firms increases because 
there are common factors that influence the illiquidity of assets across the whole 
market. The increasing individual illiquidity of REITs will increase the magnitude 
of their mispricing since illiquidity prevents informed traders from trading on 
private information. Using 2SLS regression, I find that the lagged market-wide 
illiquidity can explain 14% of the variation in REIT mispricing after controlling 
for size and value effects. This suggests that REITs tend to be mispriced when the 
stock market is illiquid. 
This dissertation also finds that the relationship between mispricing and stock 
market illiquidity is more significant when the market return is declining, market 
volatility is high, and the inflation rate is high. This is because, when the market is 
declining, fund managers are more likely to fall below the target return and will 
have to liquidate their holdings, thus increasing the demand for liquidity. Also, the 
inventory risk of market makers will increase when the market is declining and 
volatility is high. The declining market increases systematic illiquidity across 
various assets, leading to a stronger effect on mispricing.  
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This result provides new insights for the diversification opportunities of REITs in 
up and down markets. First, in a declining market, since REITs’ illiquidity tends 
to co-move with the general market’s illiquidity, investors would have difficulties 
realizing the diversification opportunity. Take the mortgage financial crisis as an 
example, when the market is declining and volatility is high, even the return 
correlation between REITs and common stocks are low, investors found much 
difficulties of selling either REITs or non-REIT ones to realize the diversification 
benefits. Second, investors need to think about whether the diversification 
opportunities remain in down markets. As the dissertation suggests that illiquidity 
has a higher effect on REITs’ mispricing in down markets, the diversification 
opportunity which examined in up markets may disappear in down markets. In 
fact, a few studies have documented that the diversification opportunity tends to 
disappear in a declining market when investors greatly need to diversify market 
risks (Goldstein and Nelling, 1999; Sagalyn, 1990; Clayton and Mackinnon, 2001). 
This suggests that investors who are interested in REITs as a diversification tool 
should study the co-movement between REITs’ illiquidity and common stocks’ 
illiquidity, as well as the influence of illiquidity on REITs, when the market return 
is declining, market volatility is high, and the inflation rate is high. 
6.2 Limitations 
There are some limitations in this study. First, this dissertation doesn’t test the 
change of REITs’ investors on mispricing.  
This dissertation finds that REITs have been more attractive to institutional 
investors since 1993. The increasing institutional investments can lead to higher 
co-movement of REITs’ illiquidity and common stocks’ illiquidity. As a result, 
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when institutional investment increases in REITs, the systematic illiquidity tends 
to have a stronger effect on REITs’ mispricing. This dissertation runs a model 
from 1993 to 2008, but does not separate the periods when institutional 
investment is high and when institutional investment is low. However, time-fixed 
effects model is used to control for the change of institutional investments in the 
long time-periods.  
Second, this dissertation finds that the mispricing-illiquidity relationship is 
asymmetric in both up and down markets, but more sophisticated models are 
needed to fully understand the effect of macroeconomic conditions. For example, 
market illiquidity is found to have a stronger effect on mispricing when the 
inflation rate is high. To thoroughly confirm the evidence, the inflation rate should 
be added to the model as an independent variable. But the panel regression model 
in this thesis does not allow for a variable which is the same for the cross-sections 
in a given time. 
Finally, modeling fundamental return is always challenging for academics. The 
CAPM provides a common way to insolate mispricing, but they may have the 
problem of model mis-specification (Eberlein, Keller and Prause, 1998; Avramov, 
2002). Given that there is no definite answer on how to measure fundamental 
price, this dissertation uses another widely-used model (Fama French Three 
Factor model) to do robust test.  
6.3 Future Studies 
This study has many empirical implications for future exploration. The most 
interesting finding which has not been examined thoroughly is the different effects 
Chapter Six – Conclusion 78 
of macroeconomic factors on the mispricing-illiquidity relationship. It is found 
that the magnitude of the illiquidity effect on mispricing is enlarged when the 
inflation rate is high. Two potential explanations are introduced in this study: the 
Fisher effect and money illusion. Future studies can investigate which explanation 
is true. Also, it is found that systematic illiquidity increases in cold markets, 
leading to a closer relationship between mispricing and illiquidity. Future studies 
can formally test the mutual linkages between market return and illiquidity in 
down markets.  
Secondly, this study does not explain why systematic illiquidity across REITs and 
common stocks is increasing. Kamara (2008) finds that the systematic illiquidity 
of small stocks has tended to decrease in recent decades. However, as stocks with 
a relatively small market cap, REITs have increasing systematic illiquidity. 
Investigating the puzzle will be helpful in explaining the sources of systematic 
illiquidity, which are debated extensively in financial literature. 
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